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ABSTRACT  
 
   
Services outsourcing is a prevalent yet problematic phenomenon. On the 
one hand, more and more firms are outsourcing services function. On the other 
hand, we are faced with many services outsourcing failures. This research 
attempts to uncover some of the omitted causes of services outsourcing failure. It 
extends a conceptual paper that used social network theory to examine the shifting 
of the triadic relationship structures among the service buyer, service supplier and 
the buyer's customers at different stages of the services outsourcing arrangements 
and its performance implications. This study empirically examines these 
performance implications. Specifically, this research defines the concept of bridge 
transfer, which denotes the weakening and dissolution of operational ties between 
the service buyer firms’ and their end customers and the appearing and 
strengthening of operational ties between the service supplier firms and the end 
customers.  It also empirically derives a measurement scale for this new construct.  
Further, the effects of bridge transfer on supplier's appropriation behavior, buyer's 
cost of quality and end customers' quality perception are examined in the context 
of customer facing services and are contrasted with those entail little or no 
customer interactions.  In addition, the moderating roles of buyer-supplier 
relationship on the effects of bridge transfer are also examined.  
An Internet-based survey was administered to firms affiliated with CAPS 
Research and the Institute of Supply Management as the primary data source 
(n=137). Principal Component Analyses were used to derive a composite score 
  ii 
for each of the model construct.  Then linear regressions were used to detect the 
effects of bridge transfer on services outsourcing outcomes and to detect the 
moderating role of buyer-supplier relationships on these effects.  
The results show that bridge transfer is positively correlated to suppliers' 
appropriate behavior and negatively correlated to end customer's quality 
perception in the context of customer facing services.  The effects of bridge 
transfer are not found for services that entail little or no interactions with the end 
customers.  Instead, buyer-supplier relationship is found to be a key influencing 
factor to services outsourcing outcomes in this context.  This study helps to 
pinpoint some of the omitted causes of services outsourcing failures and shed 
light on how to manage services outsourcing for success.   
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Services outsourcing is gaining more prominence in the business world 
(Grossman and Helpman 2002; Roth and Menor 2003; Amiti and Wei 2005).  A 
2006 CAPS Research study on services outsourcing (Tate and Ellram, 2006) 
showed that 48% of the respondents reported existing outsourcing arrangements 
in services areas.  As a comparison, only 33% were found in indirect material 
areas and 30% in direct material areas.  Similarly, on the future plan to outsource, 
respondents rated highest for service functions, followed by direct and indirect 
materials.  Not surprisingly, the intention of not to outsource is lowest for services 
(44%), followed by direct material (62%) and indirect material (64%).  (See 
attached Figure 1 Outsourcing Practice and Intentions in the following page).   
The prominence of services outsourcing not only manifests itself via the 
large percentage of firms adopting service outsourcing strategy, but also the 
varieties of functions to be outsourced, ranging from product design, research and 
development to marketing, distribution and after-sales service (Grossman & 
Helpman, 2005).  An interesting trend has been noted that in many sectors, firms 
are outsourcing customer facing services that formerly would have been produced 
in house (Taylor and Bain, 2005; Tate, 2006; Aksin, Armony and Mehrotra, 2007; 
Tate, Ellram and Brown, 2009).  One prominent example of such customer facing 
services is customer services and support.  Many major financial institutions such 
as Capital One and J. P. Morgan Chase have all outsourced a portion of their 
customer services (McLaughlin and Peppard 2006).  And this type of outsourcing 
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is not unique to the service industry.  In companies that are traditionally 
considered as manufacturing firms, we have seen the outsourcing of many after-
sales services such as software/hardware support (Aubert and Croteau 2005).  In 
the few years proceeding 2005, the growth in outsourcing of customer service and 
support functions has reached a staggering 30 percent or higher (Brown, 2005).   
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(Source:  Services Spend Management: Outsourcing/Offshoring Your Services 
Spend published by CAPS Research, August 31st, 2006.) 
  
Figure 1-1. Outsourcing Practice and Intentions 
 
1.1 The Dark-Side of Services Outsourcing 
 
In spite of the popularity gain in services outsourcing, it is not without 
problems.  According to a 2009 InformationWeek survey, 58% of companies that 
had outsourced services casted doubts on whether outsourcing could deliver 
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values to their firms or their shareholders.  Specifically, two issues are repeatedly 
mentioned in services outsourcing reports.  One is the reduction in service quality 
and customer satisfaction (King, 2010; Chopra, 2010).  For example, Chopra 
(2010) reported that post services outsourcing “the average user satisfaction 
deficit was 13 percent” (p. 1, Chopra, 2010).   Another is the failure in realizing 
cost savings.  Kaushik (2008) stated that the hidden costs of services outsourcing 
are substantial and as a result as many as 53% of customers failed to realize their 
projected cost savings.  Not surprisingly, “…the number of buyers prematurely 
terminating an outsourcing relationship has doubled to 51 percent" (Weakland 
2005, p. 2) and some even ended with expensive lawsuits.  One such example is 
the state of Indiana, who cancelled its services outsourcing deal with its former 
service provider in 2009 and later sued the provider for $1.3 billion for breach of 
contract.   
Why have there been so many failed services outsourcing attempts?  Is 
there anything special about services operations that warrants special attention? 
Are there specific strategies we should adopt in order to successfully manage 
services outsourcing?  These questions motivate this research.  Specifically, this 
research examines the triadic relationship structure among the service buyer, 
service supplier and the buyer’s customer post services outsourcing 
implementation and its impacts on buyer firms’ outsourcing outcomes.  Further, it 
examines the roles of buyer-supplier relationships in mitigating negative 
outcomes.  Lastly, it compares the effects of bridge transfer across two different 
services contexts: customer facing pure services and quasi-manufacturing type of 
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services that do not contain a large amount of customer inputs into the services 
production process. 
1.2 Existing Research in Services Outsourcing 
 
 Services outsourcing is defined as the conscious choice of using external 
agents to perform one or more service activities that used to be performed 
internally (Lacity & Hirschheim, 1993).  The extant literature on services 
outsourcing appears to heavily cluster around two broad research questions: 1) 
Should we outsource services?  2) What portion of the services should we 
outsource?  The former question is mainly addressed by economists who were 
interested in understanding the impacts that the outsourcing of services had on 
economic indicators, such as domestic employment, incomes and productivity 
(Amiti and Wei, 2005; Amiti and Wei, 2004; Fixler and Siegel, 1999; Gorg and 
Hanley, 2004).  In general, services outsourcing was found to be a positive 
contributor to the national economy in the long run.  The later question was 
addressed by researchers from Information Technology and Operations 
Management fields (Poppo and Zenger, 1998; Grover, Cheon and Teng, 1996; 
Safizadeh, Field, and Ritzman, 2008;  Cook, 1999; Roberts, 2001; Ono, 2001).  
Scholars in these fields used multiple theoretical lenses such as the Transaction 
Cost Economics, Core Competence Theory and Game Theory to examine under 
what conditions firms should make the service outsourcing decisions.  
However, conspicuously lacking is the theory of the underlying relational 
dynamics that take place in services outsourcing and how to manage these 
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relationship dynamics toward outsourcing success.  Implicit in this theoretical 
void may be an assumption that the relational dynamics in services outsourcing is 
similar to those in manufacturing with which we are already familiar - we already 
know about the buyer-supplier relationship in manufacturing outsourcing, we do 
not have a need to reconsider it in the service sector.   
In case there ever was such an assumption, this study asserts that the 
outsourcing of services involves entirely different dynamics from the outsourcing 
of manufacturing items in terms of how the relationships will be seen.  In a 
services setting, relationships among the supplier, the buyer company, and the 
buyer’s customers are much more dynamic than those in the manufacturing 
sector.  In a manufacturing setting, the buyer company sources a product from a 
supplier and then sells the final products to its customers—the supplier is 
generally invisible to the buyer’s customers.  In services outsourcing, however, 
the service supplier, by design, comes in direct contact with the buyer’s customers 
(Maltz and Ellram, 1997).  This direct contact is the underpinning characteristic of 
service operations and is the key to distinguish the relationship dynamics in 
service outsourcing from other types of outsourcing.  The consequence of this 
direct contact motivates this study.  
1.3 Framing Services Outsourcing from the Social Network Perspective  
 
This research borrowed literature from the social network perspective to 
explain the consequences of having services suppliers directly interfacing with 
services customers.  Social network studies are concerned with the positions 
  6 
and/or connectivity of a network agent relative to other agents of the network and 
their performance implications (Burt 1992; Watkins, 2003; Wellman and 
Berkowitz, 1988; Barabasi and Crandall, 2003; Granovetter, 1983; Cook, 
Emerson and Gillmore, 1983; Li and Choi, 2009; etc.).  One branch of the social 
network theory, the structural hole perspective, examines the leverage gained 
when network agents spanned across structural holes among social networks 
(Burt, 1992, 1997; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; Johnson, 2004; Walker, Kogut 
and Shan, 1997; etc.).  Here a structural hole can be denoted as the lack of 
connection between two disconnected networks (Burt, 1992, 1997, etc).  The 
network agent that spans across a structure hole is said to be in a bridge position 
(Burt, 1992, 1997, etc).   
The structural hole perspective stresses the advantage of bridging two 
disconnected networks.  The actor in the bridge position enjoys information and 
control benefits and can profit by playing off actors on each side of the structural 
hole.  However, this advantage may not last forever and is subject to decay and 
transfer.  Bridge decay happens when the previously disconnected agents 
establish a direct link with each other and thus effectively eliminating the 
advantage of the network actor who has had the bridge position (Li and Choi, 
2009).  Bridge transfer has been rarely studied and it refers to the transfer of the 
bridge position (and the advantages associated with the position) to another actors 
in the social network (Li and Choi, 2009). 
 In the services outsourcing context, the service buyer, service supplier and 
the buyer’s customers form a triadic supply network.  Li and Choi (2009) noted 
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that before outsourcing (i.e. during contract negotiation stage), the buyer is the 
“bridge” between its supplier and its customers.  During implementation, this 
bridge position begins to “decay” as its suppliers come in direct contact with the 
buyer’s customers.  Post implementation, the bridge position is intended to be 
“transferred” to the supplier.  Figure 1-2 depicts the bridge, bridge decay and 
bridge transfer concepts in services outsourcing.  
 
 
Figure 1-2. Shifting Relationship Structures in Services Outsourcing 
 
Further, Li and Choi (2009) posit that the state of “bridge transfer” has 
serious performance implications for the buyer.   It is negatively correlated to 
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services outsourcing outcomes.  The higher the degree of bridge transfer, the 
worse off the services buyer company becomes.  Instead, the buyer should 
continue to actively interact with its customer and closely monitor the supplier.  
Figure 1-3 depicts this strategy of guarding against bridge transfer. 
 
 
 
Figure 1-3. Guarding against Bridge Transfer 
 
 In this study, the effects of bridge transfer on services outsourcing 
outcomes are empirically examined.   
Research question 1:  What is the impact of bridge transfer on each node within 
the services supply triad (service buyer, service supplier and buyer’s customers)? 
 
 Specifically, we followed Brindley (2004)’s framework and examined 
supplier’s appropriation behavior (Walker, 1988; Brindley, 2004), and quality 
degradation as offered to the end customers (Anderson, Fornell and Lehmann, 
1994; Fornell, 1992; Dick and Basu, 1994, etc.)  In addition, we also examined 
buyer’s cost of quality (Feigenbaum, 1956; Juran, 1951, 1962; 1988; Carr, 1992; 
Campanella, 1987a; 1987b, etc.) which is an important concept in operations 
management. 
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Supplier’s appropriation behavior refers to the situation where a supplier 
takes advantage of his/her customer’s dependence on him/her and thereby 
increases his/her part of the total end customer revenue (Walker, 1988; Brindley, 
2004).  Suppliers can exert appropriation behavior throughout the outsourcing 
contract.  For example, when a process change needs to be implemented post 
initial contract signing, the supplier can charge an amount that is above and 
beyond the expectation of the buyer firm.  Supplier’s appropriation behavior 
increases the transaction cost (and thus decreases profitability) of the service 
buying firm (Walker, 1988). Therefore, it is important to understand what triggers 
supplier’s appropriation behavior in a services outsourcing context and how to 
control it.   
Buyer’s cost of quality is the buyer’s cost associated with the discovery 
and prevention of service failures and the costs associated with service recovery 
(Juran, 1951, 1992; Baiman, Fischer and Rajan, 2000).  Cost of quality is a key 
contributor to a firm’s operating performance and therefore has received wide 
attention in the operations management field over the past two decades 
(Omachonu, Suthummanon and Einspruch, 2004; Crosby, 1983; Campanella, 
1987a; Plunkett and Dale (1986, 1987, 1988); Campanella (1987b), Feigenbaum 
(1991), Carr (1992), Gray (1995), Diallo et al. (1995), Johnson (1995), Willis and 
Willis (1996) quoted in Grimm, 1987, pp. 397-412) Harrington, (1987, 1999), 
Robinson (1997), Shah and Fitzroy (1998), Gryna (1999), Dale (1999), Dale and 
Plunkett (1999), Campanella (1999) and Griffith (2003), etc.).   
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End customers service quality perception measures how a given service 
supplied by a company meets or exceeds customer expectations (Zeithamal and 
Bitner, 1996; Parasuraman, Zeithamal and Berry, 1985).  In a competitive 
marketplace where businesses compete for customers, service quality is seen as a 
key differentiator and increasingly has become a key element of business strategy 
(Gitman and McDaniel, 2005).   
 Besides the effects of bridge transfer on a buyer’s outsourcing outcomes, 
the role of buyer-supplier relationships in containing these effects was also 
examined.  In a triadic service supply network or any supply network, one party 
(buyer) relies on another party (supplier) to provide resources.  Therefore, there is 
an inherent degree of reliance between service buyers and suppliers.  Developing 
a good buyer-supplier relationship becomes an important factor in facilitating the 
exchange between parties in the supply network (Coleman, 1990; Uzzi, 1996).  It 
also plays an important role in finding and maintaining a competitive advantage 
(Mohr and Spekman, 1994; Liker and Choi, 2004).  
 Although the buyer-supplier relationship is considered important, its 
impact is largely examined within the dyadic contexts, i.e., how does the buyer-
supplier relationship impact the buyer or the supplier’s outcome?  This study 
extends existing research by investigating the moderating role of buyer-supplier 
relationship in the context of a triadic network that includes the buyer, the 
supplier and the buyer’s customers.  Specifically, this study examines the 
following: 
  11 
Research Question 2:  How does buyer-supplier relationship moderate the effect 
of bridge transfer on services outsourcing outcomes? 
 
Services functions are diverse.  Some services are customer facing and 
entail a large amount of customer inputs during the services delivery process 
(Chase & Aquilano, 1977).  On the other hand, there are services that entail little 
customer inputs and are quasi-manufacturing in nature (Chase, 1981; Chase and 
Tansik, 1983; Chen, Gupta and Rom, 1994; Gupta and Chen, 1995; Walley and 
Amin, 1994).  The last research question compares the effects of bridge transfer in 
the context of customer facing pure services with that in the context of quasi-
manufacturing types of services.   
Research Question 3:  How do the effects of bridge transfer differ across different 
services type? 
 
1.4 Summary of Methodology 
 
This study utilizes a survey as the primary mode of data collection.  The 
context of analysis is at a triadic level.  Multi-item scales measuring the triadic 
relationship structures among the service buyer, service supplier and buyer’s 
customers (the degree of bridge transfer), the type of relationships between the 
service buyer and the service suppliers and the outsourcing outcomes were 
developed based on existing literature (social network theory, service operations 
and relationship management) and based on the theoretical definition of the terms 
used.  These scales were then pilot-tested with Executive MBA students for face 
validity.  The resulting survey was subsequently tested with executives of services 
outsourcing firms and modified accordingly.  A final version was distributed to 
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selected companies affiliated with the CAPS Research and the Institute of Supply 
Management (ISM).  The selection of companies was based on the following two 
criteria: 1) They have outsourced a service function prior to September, 2007; 2) 
They are willing to cooperate with our research.  The total sample size is 137 
services outsourcing initiatives.   
Data collected first went through a set of Principal Component Analyses 
to compute a composite score for each of the key model constructs.  Then three 
separate multiple regressions were run to test the direct effects of bridge transfer 
and the moderating effects of buyer-supplier relationships on the three outcome 
constructs in the context of pure services.  Another three regressions were run to 
test the direct effects of bridge transfer and buyer-supplier relationship on the 
three outcomes constructs in the context of the quasi-manufacturing services.  
Details will be provided in the methodology section. 
1.5 Summary of Contributions 
 
This study focuses on how to manage services outsourcing for success, 
which is a natural progression from the “what to outsource” research that 
dominates our field (Quinn and Hilmer, 1995; Venkatatesan, 1992; Barney, 1991; 
2001; Wernerfelt, 1984; Williamson, 1975; etc.).  Its theoretical contribution is 
four-fold.  First, it introduces social network theory into the services outsourcing 
context.  As such, it offers a unique perspective on the underlying triadic 
relationship dynamics and their performance implications in a service supply 
network.  This study also extends the social network research by discovering and 
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addressing a state of “bridge transfer”, and derives a measurement scale for the 
degree of bridge transfer.  Third, this study explores the role of buyer-supplier 
relationships in moderating the effects of bridge transfer.  Lastly, this study 
delineates the effects of bridge transfer by comparing them in the customer facing 
pure services context with those in the quasi-manufacturing context.  
The results of this research provide importance guidance for managers of 
services outsourcing firms.  While relying on their suppliers to provide services to 
their end-customers, it is also imperative for the buying firms themselves to 
remain connected with their end-customers when outsourcing customer facing 
pure services.  However, outsourcing managers should use discretion when 
managing different types of services.  While it is important to maintain a close 
connection with ones’ end customers for customer facing pure services, there is 
no evidence to warrant such practice for the outsourcing of quasi-manufacturing 
types of services.   
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The literature review section served three purposes.  First, extant literature 
on services outsourcing are reviewed and gaps are identified.   Then this study 
draws strengths from two separate streams of research in supply chain 
management in order to lay the ground for building the theoretical models.  These 
two streams of research include the service operations literature and the social 
network perspective.  Lastly, two theoretical models are presented based on extant 
literature. 
2.1 Existing Literature on Services Outsourcing 
 
 Overall, literature in the services outsourcing field clustered into three 
major areas: 1) Should we outsource services? 2) Which portion of services 
should we outsource?  And lastly, to a lesser extent, 3) How to manage services 
outsourcing relationships for success?  Please refer to Table 1a-1c for a summary 
of key readings in each of these three areas.  It is worth noting that while there is a 
wealth of research in the first two areas, research in the last area is lacking.  This 
study is grounded in this less-researched area.  But first, a brief overview of 
existing studies is provided in the first two areas. 
2.1.1 Cluster One:  Should We Outsource Services? 
 
 Scholars have tackled the question of “should we outsource services?” 
from three perspectives (see Table 1a).  Firstly, at macro level, is service 
outsourcing good for the economy?  Secondly, at an industry and firm level, what 
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are the risks associated with services outsourcing?  And lastly, at the firm level, 
how does service outsourcing impact company performance?  The first 
perspective was mainly studied by economists.  In economics, research topics 
focus on the impact that the outsourcing of services has on economic indicators, 
such as domestic employment, incomes and productivity (Amiti and Wei, 2005; 
Amiti and Wei, 2004; Fixler and Siegel, 1999; Gorg and Hanley, 2004).  Overall, 
services outsourcing is found to be positively correlated to the national economy 
in the long run.   
On a less macro level, scholars also examined the risks of outsourcing and 
its impacts on a firm’s performance.  Risks of outsourcing include being 
leveraged by suppliers (Aubert, Patry, and Rivard, 1998; Walker, 1988; Brindley, 
2004), poor quality of supply (DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani, 1998; Lonsdale and 
Cox, 2000; Young and Hood, 2003) and customer dissatisfaction (Weakland, 
2005).  Other outsourcing risks include information security risks (Pemble , 
2004), loss of core activities (Welch and Nayak, 1992); loss of strategic 
flexibility; interruptions of supply; and fall in employee morale and loss of 
internal coherence (DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani, 1998; Lonsdale and Cox, 2000; 
Young and Hood, 2003).  However, these scholars tended to not fully appreciate 
the inherent difference between services and manufacturing, and sometimes 
blanket implications to both service and manufacturing outsourcing were made, 
when in fact the evidence comes from manufacturing (Welch and Nayak, 1992; 
Lonsdale and Cox, 2000).     
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 A limited number of studies have touched on specific risks associated with 
services outsourcing.  Among these, a majority of them focused on a particular 
industry, such as IT outsourcing.  Clemons, Hitt, and Snir (2000) proposed a risk 
analysis framework for understanding the benefits as well as costs of a vendor’s 
services in an IT domain.  Aubert et al. (1998) used transaction cost and agency 
theories as primary theoretical bases and categorized risk factors associated with 
IT outsourcing.  Apte and Mason’s (1995) research is one of the few papers (and 
may be the only one) that provided a systematic view of risks associated with 
service outsourcing in general without being tied to any specific industry.  These 
authors list a number of disadvantages of global outsourcing of information-
intensive services, which include difficulties in communication and coordination 
and potential for violation of intellectual property rights.   
Based on a review of literature on services outsourcing, very few scholarly 
writing’s have focused on the risks caused by allowing customers to directly 
interface with one’s suppliers, a fundamental phenomenon in services 
outsourcing.  It is worth noting that in the research conducted by Maltz and 
Ellram (1997 on total cost of relationship, they recognized the additional interface 
between the logistics service suppliers and the customers and proposed the cost of 
managing this interface should be factored in when making the outsourcing 
decisions.  This study also grounds on this additional interface.  Yet the focus is 
not whether we should outsource services, but how to manage services 
outsourcing relationships to mitigate these risks.   
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Table  2-1  
Summary of Key Research in Services Outsourcing 
 
Table  2-1a  
Summary of Key Research in Services Outsourcing-Should We Outsource  
 
Services? 
 
 
 
Should We Outsource Services? 
 
 
• The Importance of Services Outsourcing to National Economy 
 
Fixler and 
Siegel, 1999;  
Analyzed the implications of outsourcing on output and 
productivity growth of service industries. Findings indicated 
that services outsourcing has reduced service sector 
productivity in the short run. However, projected that 
productivity growth in services is likely to increase in the 
future. 
 
Heshmati, 2003;  Discussed the relationship between outsourcing and 
productivity growth in manufacturing and services. Showed 
that with adjusted production function, there is a positive 
relationship between productive and services outsourcing.   
 
Gorg and 
Hanley, 2004;  
Investigated the relationship between outsourcing and 
profitability.  Distinguished outsourcing of materials from 
outsourcing of services inputs. Findings suggested that plants 
that are substantially larger than the mean employment size 
benefitted from outsourcing materials while the relationship 
from services outsourcing was not clear-cut. 
 
Amiti and Wei, 
2005. 
Showed that in the United States and many other industrial 
countries ‘insourcing’ of services was greater than 
outsourcing. Using the United Kingdom as a case study, the 
authors found that job growth at a sectoral level was not 
negatively related to service outsourcing. 
  
• Risks of Services Outsourcing 
 
Maltz and 
Ellram (1997) 
Proposed an analytical framework for the logistics outsourcing 
decision.  In this framework, the total cost of relationship 
  18 
 incorporates the cost of managing the supplier (logistics 
provider) and customer relationships. 
  
Apte and 
Mason’s (1995)  
Analyzed the opportunities and challenges of global 
disaggregation of information-intensive services. Proposed a 
taxonomy of disaggregation, and developed a theoretical 
framework that identified the criteria and guidelines for 
successfully selecting service activities to be globally 
disaggregated. 
 
Clemons, Hitt, 
and Snir (2000) 
Proposed a risk analysis framework for understanding the 
benefits and costs of utilizing a vendor’s services in IT 
domain. The fundamental drivers of risk are information 
asymmetries before contracting, inability to monitor partners’ 
actions perfectly, and exogenous changes that allow one party 
to behave opportunistically. Provided prescriptions on 
efficient and effective contractual arrangements. 
 
Aubert et al. 
(1998) 
Identified components of IT outsourcing risk exposure. 
 
 
• Impact on Company Performance  
 
Poppo and 
Zenger, 1998;  
Examined firm’s boundary choice in IT services.  Developed 
and tested a model of comparative institutional performance 
rather than institutional choice.  Results suggested that a 
theory of the firm and a theory of boundary choice were likely 
to be complex, requiring integration of transaction cost, 
knowledge-based, and measurement reasoning.  
 
Grover, Cheon, 
and Teng, 1996;  
Overall IS outsourcing and its five component functions were 
examined for their relationships with outsourcing success. The 
effect of service quality of the provider and the ability of 
companies to build a partnership on these relationships were 
hypothesized and studied. Outsourcing success was found to 
be highly related to the degree of outsourcing of two 
functions, systems operations and telecommunications. The 
results indicated that transaction cost theory provided a good 
framework for IS outsourcing and that asset specificity of 
outsourcing transactions needed to be considered in any 
decision to outsource. Also, both service quality of the vendor 
and elements of partnership such as trust, cooperation, and 
communication were important for outsourcing success.  
 
Elitzur and 
Wensley, 1997  
Investigated some of the ways in which game theory can help 
us to understand the structure and function of information 
systems outsourcing arrangements.  
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2.1.2 Cluster Two: Which Portion of Services Should We Outsource? 
 
Once scholars are over the debate of whether we should outsource 
services, a natural progression of research is then to identify which function(s) 
should  be outsourced? Here one particular theoretical framework received a lot of 
attention-the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE).  TCE posited that when a 
company faces the make vs. buy decision, it needs to consider both the production 
costs and the transaction costs associated with outsourcing.  The decision should 
be based on which choice can minimize the sum of the two cost components 
(Williamson, 1975; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; 
Lacity and Willcocks, 1995; Ang and Straub, 1998).   
Various scholars applied TCE to services outsourcing settings.  For 
example, Ellram, Tate and Billington (2008) utilized TCE to examine how firms 
manage the costs and risks of offshore outsourcing of professional services.  They 
found that fixed costs of establishing the relationship dominated the variable costs 
of day-to-day transactions, and that organizations would not offshore outsource 
areas where there is high perceived degree of unmanageable risk.  Grover, Cheon 
and Teng (1996) used TCE to examine the outsourcing decision in Information 
System (IS) projects and found TCE provided a good framework for IS 
outsourcing and one particular dimension of TCE, asset specificity, needed to be 
considered in any decision to outsource.  Similarly, Klass et al (2001) and Poppo 
and Zenger (1998) all used TCE in analyzing services outsourcing decisions.  
Table 1b depicted existing research in this area. 
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It is worth noting that there is a limited application of another well-known 
theory - the core competence theory (CCT), in services outsourcing settings.  CCT 
stated that companies should focus on a set of core competencies where they can 
achieve definable preeminence and outsource the rest (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; 
Venkatesen, 1992; Quinn and Hilmer, 1995; Sharpe, 1997).  While widely 
accepted as the guidance for outsourcing practice in general, it is peculiar that 
little research has empirically examined its application in services outsourcing 
settings.  One exception is Mantel et al. (2006) which used an experimental 
design approach to investigate the impacts of three factors (strategic vulnerability, 
the degree of core competency and the formality of the information about supply 
alternatives) on outsourcing decisions.   The results showed that core competency 
does influence the outsourcing decision.  However, strategic vulnerability has 
greater influence than core competency and information formality moderates the 
make–buy decision when the strategic vulnerability and core competency 
conditions are mixed.   
Table 2-1b  
Summary of Key Research in Services Outsourcing-What Services Functions to 
Outsource? 
 
What Services Functions to Outsource? 
 
 
• The application of Transaction Cost Economics 
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Ellram, Tate and 
Billington, 2008  
 
Utilized the transaction cost economics (TCE) to 
examine how firms manage the costs and risks of 
offshore outsourcing of professional services. Found 
that fixed costs of establishing the relationship 
dominated the variable costs of day-to-day 
transactions, and that organizations would not offshore 
outsource areas where there is high perceived degree of 
unmanageable risk.  
 
Grover, Cheon, and 
Teng, 1996; 
Overall IS outsourcing and its five component 
functions were examined for their relationships with 
outsourcing success.   The results indicated that 
transaction cost theory provided a good framework for 
IS outsourcing and that asset specificity of outsourcing 
transactions needed to be considered in any decision to 
outsource. 
 
Poppo and Zenger, 
1998;  
Contrasted Transaction Cost Economics with 
knowledge based theory and measurement reasoning.  
Results suggested that a theory of the firm and a theory 
of boundary choice were likely to be complex, 
requiring integration of transaction cost, knowledge-
based, and measurement reasoning.  
 
Klaas et al, 2001 Using a Transaction Cost Economics perspective, this 
study examined whether organizational-level factors 
moderated the relationship between the degree of 
reliance on HR outsourcing and the perceived benefits 
produced by outsourcing. Support was found for a 
number of the transaction cost hypotheses regarding 
the impact of organizational characteristics.  
 
• The application of Transaction Cost Economics 
 
Mantel et al, 2006 Conducted an experiment to examine the impacts of 
three factors (strategic vulnerability, the degree of core 
competency and the formality of the information about 
supply alternatives) on outsourcing decisions.   The 
results showed that: strategic vulnerability and core 
competency do influence the outsourcing decision, 
strategic vulnerability has greater influence than core 
competency and information formality moderates the 
make–buy decision when the strategic vulnerability and 
core competency conditions are mixed. 
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2.1.3 Cluster Three: How to Manage Relationships in Services 
Outsourcing? 
 
 Although there are a good number of research papers on “should we 
outsource” and “what to outsource”, research on how to manage relationships in 
services outsourcing is lacking.  Among the limited number of studies, most (if 
not all) focused on the dyadic relationship structure between the buyer and the 
supplier.  Grover et al (1996) found that elements of the buyer-supplier 
relationship such as trust, cooperation, and communication were important for 
outsourcing success.  Similarly, Ellram et al (2008) found that the cost of setting 
up the buyer-supplier relationship was a key consideration in services outsourcing 
decisions and that managing and controlling outsourced services relationships 
were critical to outsourcing success.   One common theme of these two studies is 
that only the buyer-supplier relationships were considered (See Table 1c). 
 Li and Choi (2009) improved upon the existing dyadic level studies and 
examined relationship management at a triadic level-among service buyer, service 
supplier and service customers.  Specifically, Li and Choi (2009) used social 
network theory to examine different triadic relationship typologies prior, during 
and post services outsourcing arrangements.  They also posited that the state of 
“bridge transfer” has serious performance implications for the buyer.   Bridge 
decay is a more desirable strategy than bridge transfer.  The buyer should 
continue to actively interact with its customers and closely monitor the supplier. 
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 This research extended Li and Choi (2009)’s study and empirically 
examined the impact of degrees of bridge transfer on services outsourcing 
outcomes for both pure services and quasi-manufacturing services.  It also 
examined the role of buyer-supplier relationships in mitigating negative 
outsourcing outcomes.  To my knowledge, Li and Choi (2009) and this study are 
the only ones that evaluate services outsourcing in triadic contexts.  By doing so, 
they were able to offer unique perspectives on the relationship dynamics among 
the service buyer, service supplier and the buyer’s customers and to derive 
managerial relevant implications.  In the next section, a theoretical framework 
was built based on the integration of two streams of literature – services 
operations literature and the social network theory literature. 
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Table 2-1c  
Summary of Key Research in Services Outsourcing-How to Manage Services 
Outsourcing Relationships? 
 
 
How to Manage Services Outsourcing Relationships? 
 
 
Author/Year 
 
Key Findings 
Relationship 
Structure 
 
Grover, Cheon, 
and Teng, 
1996; 
The effect of service quality of the provider 
and the ability of companies to build a 
partnership on these relationships were 
hypothesized and studied.  Results indicated 
that both service quality of the vendor and 
elements of partnership such as trust, 
cooperation, and communication were 
important for outsourcing success.  
 
Dyadic 
Relationship 
(Buyer-
Supplier) 
Ellram, Tate 
and Billington, 
2008  
 
Using the tenants of TCE, this paper 
postulated that fixed costs of establishing the 
relationship dominate the variable costs of 
day-to-day transactions.  The paper expanded 
on themes provided by TCE and offers some 
lessons learned, and guidelines for managing 
and controlling offshore outsourced services 
relationships. 
 
Dyadic 
Relationship 
(Buyer-
Supplier) 
Li and Choi, 
2009 
Used social network theory to examine the 
shifting of the triadic relationship structures 
among the service buyer, service supplier and 
the buyer’s customers at different stages of 
the services outsourcing arrangements.   
 
Triadic 
Relationship 
(Buyer-
Supplier-
Customer) 
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2.2 Theoretical Framework 
 
 In this section, two streams of supply chain literature were discussed from 
which the key theoretical framework was created.  These two streams of literature 
included service operations literature and the social network perspective.   
2.2.1 Services Operations Literature 
 
 Two important insights were derived from the service operations 
literature: What are the unique characteristics of services operations?  And 
secondly, what are the major types of services operations? 
What are the unique characteristics of services operations? 
 
 There is one enduring characteristic of services—customer interaction 
during the process of delivery (Gaither and Frazier 1999; Sampson, 2001; 
Sampson and Froehle, 2006).  Sampson and Froehle (2006) surveyed the service 
literature and proposed a definition of services that focuses on both interaction 
and the role of customer inputs in this interaction.  Following Sampson and 
Froehle’s Unified Services Theory (UST) approach, this paper posited that the 
real-time interaction between the provider and customers underlies the basic 
nature of services. 
 Consider the service operations of a call center where customers call in to 
seek help on various issues, for example, those related to software usage.  Based 
on the specific questions asked, the customer support representative attempts 
answers.  It may take several iterations of questions and answers between them 
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before a final solution is offered.  In this scenario, what distinguishes this 
transaction from a manufacturing transaction is the interactive process involved in 
defining customer needs and delivering the service. 
 The marketing literature also addressed the “customer inputs” nature in 
services operations, though sometimes it is termed as “co-production” (Bitner and 
Brown, 2006; Bendapudi and Leone, 2003; Ramirez, 1999; Auh, Bell, McLeod 
and Shih, 2007).  The outcome of this interaction has been labeled intangible 
(Bannock, Baxter, and Reese 1982; Karmarkar and Pitbladdo 1995; Pearce, 
1981), perishable (Lovelock and Gummesson, 2004; Sampson, 2001), 
heterogeneous (Nie and Kellogg, 1999), and simultaneous (Sampson, 2001).  
Scholars have also noticed the problem associated with measuring services 
operations.  For example, Schonberger (1980) noticed that “measuring quality of 
intangible purchases is the central problem that makes purchasing intangibles a 
special challenge (p. 25 of Schonberger, 1980).  Services “can seldom be tried 
out, inspected, or tested in advance” (Levitt, 1981). This paper posits that the root 
of the measurement problem goes back to the nature of services-customer inputs.  
Each customer brings in unique sets of inputs, therefore making services 
operations hard to be standardized or measured. 
Customer Contact Theory and Services Classification 
 
 Customer contact theory (CCT) (Chase & Aquilano, 1977; Kellogg & 
Chase, 1995) triangulates the “customer inputs” definition of services operations.  
Customer contact is defined as the time a customer spends in the system relative 
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to the total time of creating the service.  Introduced by Chase and Aquilano 
(1977), this theory represents one of the first attempts to not apply product-
oriented thinking when considering operations management problems inherent in 
service settings.  As such, CCT emphasizes the importance of the interaction that 
occurs between the service provider and the customer.  For instance, according to 
CCT, “the main feature that sets a service system apart from a manufacturing 
system is the extent to which the customer must be in direct contact” (Chase and 
Aquilano 1977, p. 17). 
In keeping with CCT, services can be classified into three broad 
categories: pure services, mixed services, and quasi-manufacturing services 
(Chase, 1981; Chase and Tansik, 1983; Chen, Gupta and Rom, 1994; Gupta and 
Chen, 1995; Walley and Amin, 1994).  “Pure services include those organizations 
whose major production is carried on in the presence of the customers” (Chase, 
1981, p. 701).  An example of pure service would be the customer service desk at 
the airport.  Here the service representatives would have face-to-face contact with 
the customers and the majority (if not all) of the service production process is 
carried out in front of the customers.   Mixed services “commonly involve a mix 
of face-to-face contact and loosely coupled back office work” (Chase, 1981, p. 
701).  An example of mixed service is X-ray service in the healthcare industry 
where the technician first meets face-to-face with the patient to take the X-ray 
image.  Then a specialist would work in the back room to interpret and record the 
results, without the presence of the customer.  As a final step, the doctor would 
meet face-to-face with the patient again and inform him/her of the results.   
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Lastly, quasi-manufacturing “entails virtually no face-to-face contact” (Chase, 
1981, p. 702).  An example of quasi-manufacturing is payroll processing services 
where no face-to-face contact with the customer is expected.  
In this study, the main focus was on the outsourcing of customer facing 
pure services because it epitomized the “customer inputs” nature of services 
operations.  The theoretical model was built for the outsourcing of customer 
facing functions which entail intensive interactions with the service 
representatives and the customers, such as in customer services or after-sales 
support.  In addition, the effects of bridge transfer on services outsourcing 
outcomes were also tested in an opposite context, the quasi-manufacturing 
settings which entail no customer inputs.  These effects were then compared to 
that of pure services to better delineate the effects of bridge transfer. 
Technology Mediated Customer Contact 
 
 While customer contact was originally defined as “face-to-face” 
interaction that requires the co-location of customers and service representatives 
(Chase, 1981), in recent years, this limitation has been reevaluated.  Recognizing 
the rapid advancements in information technology, Frohle and Roth (2004) 
proposed five conceptual archetypes of customer contact in relation to 
technology.   These five archetypes include: technology-free customer contact, 
technology-assisted customer contact, technology facilitated customer contact, 
technology mediated customer contact and technology-generated customer 
contact.  Figure 2-1 depicts these 5 conceptual archetypes. 
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Source: (Frohle and Roth, 2004) 
Figure 2-1. Five Archetypes of Customer Contacts in Relation to 
Technology 
 
 Technology free customer contact refers to service offerings where the 
customer is in physical proximity of, and interacts with, a service representative. 
This archetype is consistent with the traditional notions of face-to-face service 
encounters emphasized by Chase (1978). In technology-free customer contact, 
technology per se does not play a direct role in providing the service. Examples of 
technology-free customer contact include a psychiatrist’s in-office consultation 
with a patient, a retail bank teller exchanging a customer’s coins for paper 
currency, or an old-fashioned, general store clerk transacting the sale of 
merchandise with a cash drawer. 
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 Technology assisted-customer contact refers to services encounters where 
the service representative employs technology as an aid to improve the face-to-
face contact, but the customer does not have access to the technology. This 
situation often occurs during airline check-in: the service representative interacts 
with a computer terminal, but the customer does not. 
 Technology-facilitated customer contact happens where, during the face-
to-face service encounter, both the service representative and the customer have 
access to the same technology. Here technology is employed to enhance the face-
to-face communication between a customer and a service provider, such as when 
a financial consultant uses PowerPoint in a meeting with a client. 
 Technology-mediated customer contact happens where the customer and 
the human service representative are not physically co-located. Therefore, the 
service encounter is not a traditional face-to-face contact. To enable 
communication, some form of technology must be employed, such as when a 
voice telephone call or online instant messaging is initiated with a customer 
service rep in a back-office call center. 
 Finally, there is technology-generated customer contact, where the human 
customer service representative component of the service encounter is entirely 
replaced by technology. This is the most technology-intensive situation. For 
example, bank ATMs, self-service kiosks, automated car washes, and website-
based knowledge-bases offer the option of service without the assistance of 
human service reps.  
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 For this study, the first four archetypes (i.e., from technology-free 
customer contact to technology facilitated customer contact) were incorporated.  
This will allow the study of services operations where the service representatives 
and the customers are either physically co-located or virtually co-located.  It is 
also in line with the outsourcing practice of customer facing functions.  For 
example, most credit card companies that outsource their customer support expect 
their customers to “call” in on billing issues.  In this case, the telephone has 
enabled the service representative and the customer to virtually co-located during 
this service encounter.  Finally, this research purposely excluded technology-
generated customer contact due to the absence of the service representatives. 
2.2.2 Services and Services Outsourcing   
 
Outsourcing is typically defined as the conscious choice of replacing 
internal functions with the use of external agents to perform one or more 
production or service activities (Gilley and Rasheed, 2000).   It seems then 
services outsourcing should be similar to manufacturing outsourcing: in services 
outsourcing we just outsource intangible goods, such as customer service; while 
in manufacturing outsourcing we outsource tangible goods such as parts and raw 
materials.  Contrary to our initial intuition, there are fundamental differences 
underlying the two types of outsourcing arrangements and it is important to 
understand these differences. 
Hewlett-Packard (HP), one of the world’s top manufacturers of notebook 
PCs, was outsourcing its manufacturing in the 1990s.  When a retail shop ordered 
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Pavilion zd8000 laptops, this shop interacted with HP but had no contact with the 
suppliers.  It was HP that interfaced with the suppliers—an assembly supplier in 
Taiwan, a graphic chip supplier in Markham, Ontario, liquid crystal display 
screens and memory chip suppliers in South Korea and Taiwan, and a hard-disk 
drive supplier in Japan (Dean and Tam, 2005).  In this type of manufacturing 
outsourcing arrangement, the customer is not in direct contact with any of HP’s 
suppliers.  HP, acting as a go-between or bridge, controls the direct information 
and product flows between its suppliers and its customers prior to, during, and 
after the outsourcing. 
Such relational dynamics change when it comes to a services setting.  
Besides outsourcing its manufacturing operation, HP also outsourced some 
service work—a portion of its software support activity.  In this case, the 
customer service representatives from the supplier company were in direct contact 
with the customers of HP when offering their services. HP had no ready measure 
to control this interaction while its suppliers delivered their services to HP’s 
customers. 
Figure 2-2 depicts these two different structural arrangements.  The linear 
diagram on the top represents a manufacturing setting wherein manufacturing 
buyers can effectively control the interaction between its suppliers and its 
customers.  The triangular diagram on the bottom of Figure 2-2 depicts the 
services setting where the services supplier and the buyer’s customer contact each 
other directly.  The triadic relationship structure among the services buyer, 
services supplier and buyer’s customer in Figure 2-2 served as the foundation of 
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this study.  Specifically, services outsourcing was framed from the lens of the 
social network theory and examined different triadic structural arrangements on 
services outsourcing outcomes. 
 
Types of Supply 
Networks 
 
Basic Triadic Structures 
 
 
Manufacturing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2.  Comparison of Supply Chain Triadic Relationship Structures in 
Manufacturing vs. Services 
 
 
2.2.3 Social Network Perspective 
 
 A network is made of elements and the links that connect these elements 
(Borgatti and Li, 2009; ).  When these elements represent “agents” that are able to 
make volitional choices, such as individuals or organizations, the network is 
called a social network (Borgatti and Li, 2009; Burt 1992; Watkins, 2003; 
Wellman and Berkowitz, 1988; etc).  The theoretical model for this study was 
built on two key perspectives from the social network literature: social capital 
(Coleman, 1988, 1990) and the structural hole concept (Burt, 1992, 1997).   
Customer Buyer Supplier 
 Buyer 
Supplier Customer 
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Social Capital and the Structural Hole Perspective 
 
 Social capital derives from an agent’s relationship with other agents in the 
same network through which the agent gains access to resources (Coleman, 
1990).  One particular type of relational arrangement is called a structural hole, 
wherein an agent works as a bridge between two other agents or networks with no 
links between them (Burt, 1992, 1997; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000).  After an 
explanation of both social capital and the structural hole concept, the theoretical 
framework of services outsourcing relational arrangements were built upon.
 There are two schools of thought regarding social capital (Bae and 
Gargiulo, 2004; Balkundi, Kilduff, Barsness and Michael, 2007; Borgatti and 
Foster, 2003; Burt, 2000; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000).  While one school 
promotes the virtue of having connections, the other focuses on the virtue of no 
connections.  The first group, known as the traditional school, focuses on making 
connections among agents in the network and the associated benefits of such 
connections (Coleman, 1988, 1990). These scholars encourage such connections. 
In contrast, others focus on the positive effects of no connections and negative 
effects of losing the unconnected state (Burt, 1992, 1997).  The concept of a 
structural hole is a result of this school—the bridge that sits on a structural hole 
gains leverage, but such leverage is lost when the structural hole is filled when the 
two isolated agents or networks make a connection.  In other words, the 
traditional school promotes network closure—the establishment of strong ties and, 
as a result, increasing trust and cooperation within a network (Gargiulo and 
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Benassi, 2000; Coleman, 1990; Coleman, 1988).  Those in the opposite school 
take a positional approach and argue that actors benefit from brokering 
opportunities created by disperse ties, and thus they discourage network closure 
(Balkundi, Kilduff, Barsness and Michael, 2007; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; 
Burt, 1992, 1997).  The latter approach, the positional view has received much 
current attention in social network research (Balkundi et al., 2007), and it offers 
the theoretical foundation for our concepts of bridge transfer.   
Structural Hole Perspective 
 
 The “hole” in a structural hole is represented by the state of no connection, 
and the “structure” of the relationships is obtained by the fact that the connections 
exist through the bridge.  The bridge is the agent that is positioned on the 
structural hole.  In the absence of a connection between two isolated agents, the 
bridge acts as a go-between and the gatekeeper of information.   
 The underlying premise of the structural-hole theory is that the structure of 
the network is what determines dynamics among actors because social actors in 
some positions in the networks are better off than those in other positions (Burt, 
1992).  Specifically, social actors that occupy the bridge position over a structural 
hole enjoy brokerage opportunities.  Formally, a structural hole is defined as the 
“weak” connections between groups that are not directly linked together (Burt, 
1992; Burt 2000).  Figure 2-3 depicts the structural-hole concept.   
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Figure 2-3. The Structural Hole Concept 
 
 Figure 2-3 shows three agents. Agent 1 and Agent 2 are directly linked to 
Agent 3 but they are not directly linked to each other.  This lack of connection 
forms a structural hole.  A structural hole “creates a competitive advantage for an 
individual whose relationships span the holes” (Burt, 2000, p. 6).  Agent 3 spans 
the structural hole between Agent 1 and Agent 2 and therefore reaps benefits that 
come with this position. 
Benefits of Being Bridge 
 
 Burt (2000, 2002) posits that the bridge position leads to two types of 
advantages.  One is the information benefit (Burt, 1992, 2000, 2002).  Since a 
structural hole can be viewed as a gap between two non-redundant networks, 
agents who occupy the bridge position can benefit from additional information 
from non-redundant sources rather than overlapping information from the same 
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source.  The second advantage is the control benefit.  Simmel (1955) and Merton 
(1968) introduced the ideal type of people who derive control from the structural 
hole—the tertius gaudens or a third person who benefits from brokering the 
connection between others (Burt, 2000; Burt 1992).  In this study, tertius gaudens 
is equivalent to the bridge.  The bridge can negotiate and exploit information to its 
advantage (Burt, 2000; Zaheer and Bell, 2005).  “Accurate, ambiguous, or 
distorted information is strategically moved between contacts by the tertius” 
(Burt, 2000, p. 8).  
 Beyond gaining access to information and control of information as 
benefits, Zaheer and Bell (2005) pointed out additional advantages of the bridge.  
By accessing information from unique parts of the network, the bridge can hear 
about the impending threats and opportunities before other actors who are not in 
the bridge position.  It can also learn about the quality of possible exchange 
partners and potential allies (Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994; Uzzi, 1996; Zaheer 
and Bell, 2005.).   
Bridge Decay and Bridge Transfer 
 
 Being the bridge may be a good thing, but as the cliché goes, not all good 
things last forever.  A firm’s bridge position, although beneficial, is not a 
permanent state and is subject to change (Burt, 2000; Burt, 2002; Soda, Usai and 
Zaheer, 2004).  First, the two agents that are otherwise isolated by the bridge can 
begin making connections and reduce the leverage of the bridge, creating the state 
called “bridge decay.”  Second, the bridge can willingly or unwillingly relinquish 
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its position to one of the other two agents and create a state we call “bridge 
transfer.”  Structurally, bridge transfer happens if the existing structural hole is 
filled and one of the other two links is disconnected.  Bridge decay happens once 
the agents on each side of the structural hole are able to link with each other 
directly, the connection to the agent that used to be the bridge becomes redundant 
and loses its value (Johnson, 2004).  (A note here is that the term “bridge decay” 
first appeared in Burt (2000).  In its original intent, Burt used the term “bridge 
decay” to denote the disappearance of bridge position caused by the broker’s loss 
of contacts with entities on either side of him/her.  In this study, bridge decay 
concept was used in a different context.  It referred to the disappearance of the 
bridge position caused by the setting up of direct linkages between the entities on 
either side of the broker.  Conceptually, it is more closely linked to the 
“dissolution of structure hold brokerage” concept used by Johnson (2004)).  
 Bridge decay has implications for the stability of social capital.  With the 
loss of the bridge position, a social agent also loses the advantage of social capital 
it has enjoyed.  Therefore, it is seldom to the benefit of agents who hold the 
bridge position to encourage others to join them in linking groups, because then 
they become redundant and lose their value (Johnson, 2004).  This puts the 
burden on the social agent to make extra effort to maintain the bridge position 
(Burt, 2001).  Even after the decaying of the bridge, the shifting of the 
relationship structure is by no means over.  This structural shifting is bridge 
transfer.  Compared to bridge decay, bridge transfer is rarely studied.   
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 Figure 2-4 depicts the concepts of bridge decay and bridge transfer.  
During the initial stage for both bridge decay and bridge transfer, A is in the 
bridge position across the structural hole created between two non-redundant 
agents, B and C.  During the transformed stage, differences begin to emerge.  In 
the bridge decay scenario, B and C establish a direct link with each other, 
effectively eliminating the structural hole and nullifying the A’s bridge position.  
In the bridge transfer scenario, while B establishes a direct link with C, A loses its 
direct link with C, causing a structural hole between A and C.  B now became the 
bridge and enjoys the benefits of social capital brought by its position and power 
and influence in the network of agents. 
In this study, bridge transfer refers to the removal of the bridge status from 
one node and its simultaneous relocation to another node in a triadic network (Li 
and Choi, 2009).  A bridge is defined as a structure that spans and provides 
connections over information and control chasms between two otherwise 
unconnected nodes (Burt, 1992; 2001).  In this research context, bridge transfer 
encompasses the weakening and disappearing of operational ties between two 
previously connected actors (i.e, the service buyer and buyer’s customers) and the 
appearing and strengthening of operational ties between two previously 
unconnected actors (i.e., the service suppliers and buyer’s customers (Li and 
Choi, 2009.)  Further, the removal and the relocation of the bridge position needs 
to happen concurrently in order to maintain the triadic structure. 
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Figure 2-4. Bridge Decay versus Bridge Transfer  
 
2.3 Towards a Theory of Dynamic Relationship Arrangement in 
Services Outsourcing 
 
 Li and Choi (2009) was the first to apply the structural hole perspective in 
services outsourcing.  They posited that prior to services outsourcing (during the 
contract negotiation stage), the buyer is the bridge between its suppliers and its 
end-customers and therefore enjoyed information and control benefits associated 
with the bridge position.  However, once the negotiation is in place and the 
service suppliers are in direct contact with their customers, this bridge position 
began to decay, so did the benefits enjoyed by the buyer.  Post implementation, if 
left unmanaged, the service supplier will resume the bridge position and enjoyed 
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Agent B Agent B 
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the benefits of the bridge (thus the bridge has been transferred to the supplier).  
Further, Li and Choi (2009) posited that bridge decay is a much more desirable 
strategy than bridge transfer for the buyer company.  The buyer company should 
actively monitor its supplier, its customers and the relationship between its 
supplier and its customers even after the services outsourcing arrangements. 
 This study extends Li and Choi (2009)’s work and empirically tests the 
impacts of bridge transfer on services outsourcing outcomes.  Figure 2-5 in the 
next page depicts the theoretical models.  Figure 2-5a represents the key 
theoretical model for customer facing pure services context.  It is also referred to 
as “the effect model” in future paragraphs.  Figure 2-5b represents the comparison 
model for quasi-manufacturing context.  It is referred to as “the no-effect model” 
in future paragraphs.  Three services outsourcing outcomes are examined, namely 
the supplier’s appropriation behavior, buyer’s cost of quality, and end customer’s 
quality perception, each corresponding to a node in the services supply triad.  
These three aspects are also key performance indicators in operations 
management literature (Bardhan, Mithas and Lin, 2007; Narasimhan, Jayaram and 
Carter, 2001; Venkataraman, 1997; Williamson, 1981; Samson and Terziovski, 
1999; Shin, Collier and Wilson, 2000; Anderson and Sohal, 1999; Walker, 1988; 
Brindley, 2004).  Each of these three outcomes is addressed below. 
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Figure 2-5a. The Effect Model (Impacts of Bridge Transfer on Services 
Outsourcing Outcomes in the Context of Customer Facing Pure Services) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-5b. The No-Effect Model (Impacts of Bridge Transfer on Services 
Outsourcing Outcomes in the Context of Quasi-Manufacturing Services) 
 
FIGURE 2-5.  Theoretical Models 
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2.3.1  The Impact of Bridge Transfer on Supplier’s Appropriation 
Behavior 
  
Supplier’s appropriation behavior refers to a situation where a supplier 
takes advantage of his customer’s dependence on him/her and thereby increases 
his/her part of the total end customer revenues (Walker, 1988; Brindley, 2004).  In 
this case, the supplier is “appropriating” more money towards its income, away 
from the service buyer firm.  An example of the supplier’s appropriation behavior 
is that a supplier increases contract costs at renewal times above and beyond the 
expectation of the buyer firm.  They can also charge a substantial amount of 
money for any contract revisions.   
The existing research has emphasized the damaging effects of a supplier’s 
appropriation behavior.  Walker (1988) proposed that appropriation risk can lead 
to decline in the performance of the firm.   Appropriation behavior of the supplier 
firm, the potential for a decline in an equitable exchange relationship between the 
buyer and supplier in favor of the supplier firm, can occur in the absence of 
specialized assets and increase total contract costs of the buyer firm (Walker, 
1988; Brindley, 2004).  Walker also examined this risk under varying conditions 
and found that it occurred in all cases where the supplier is downstream to the 
firm such as in services outsourcing cases.   
However, in a service supply triad with three potentially links (buyer-
supplier, buyer-end customer, supplier-end customer), the buyer-supplier link is 
not sufficient to address the added complexity in this triadic structure (Tate, 
Ellram and Brown, 2009; Maltz and Ellram, 1997).  In this research, existing 
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relationship literature is extended by examining the effects of buyer-customer link 
on the service supplier’s appropriation behavior. 
 In this study, appropriation behavior is operationalized as the tendency of 
supplier firm to increase contract prices above and beyond the expectation of the 
buyer firm.   Although most contracts are negotiated prior to the outsourcing 
arrangements, it does not always remain constant.  Firstly, service operations 
contract specifications are difficult to be described precisely (Levitt, 1981).  This 
leaves a lot of room for interpretation of what is in and what is out of the scope of 
the pre-determined contract price.  Service suppliers can then request additional 
payments for any service it regards as outside the original scope.  Secondly, 
business processes are ever changing.  Few if any contracts, of any complexity, 
will remain within the parameters of the pre-negotiated contract without any 
revisions/change of scope.  The costs associated with these revisions/changes of 
scope all add to the total contract price.  Thirdly, a lot of contracts are divided into 
different phases and renewal is needed at different thresholds.  The renewal costs, 
which may be seen as a part of the total contract costs covering all project phases, 
may need to be re-negotiated.    Fourthly, contract terms vary by firms.  Instead of 
a fixed amount contract, suppliers may bill the buyer firm on time and material 
basis.  In this case, the total contract cost will vary based on the amount of service 
tendered. 
 A price hike is more likely to occur when the buyer firm allows the 
supplier firm to assume the bridge position, i.e., bridge transfer, by taking a 
hands-off approach to its customers.  If bridge transfer happens to the supplier 
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firm, the suppliers, being the only direct connection between its customers and its 
buyer, can play off the service buyer and its customers to gain advantages in 
subsequent contract negotiations.  For example, it can exaggerate the task 
complexity or task volume involved to the buyer firm to demand more 
compensation for its work.   
In pure services, or a service that entails a high degree of customer 
contact, it inherently contains a high degree of variability and uncertainty 
introduced by customers (Sampson and Froehle, 2006).  These variability and 
uncertainty make it difficult to estimate tasks complexities and volumes unless 
one is closely connected with the end customers (Schonberger, 1980; Levitt, 
1981).  If the service buyer firm loses its connection with its end customer, it has 
to instead rely entirely on the accounts from the service suppliers for task 
complexity.  This dependency gives suppliers a lot of room for gaming behavior 
(Nagin, Rebitzer, Sander and Taylor, 2002), i.e., strategically exaggerating task 
difficulties while demanding higher contract prices.  The service supplier firm, 
acting as a rational actor striving to optimize its own profit, will choose to 
increase its end of the revenue by raising the price for the services rendered.  Thus 
the following hypothesis is put forward: 
 
H1: In the context of outsourcing of pure service, bridge transfer is positively 
correlated with contract cost increase. 
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Further, the effect of bridge transfer is not universal across all services 
outsourcing instances.  Buyer-supplier relationship moderates the gaming 
behavior of the supplier.  There are two major types of buyer-supplier 
relationships—adversarial and collaborative (Auster, 1994; Gulati, 1998; 
Humphreys, Shiu, and Chan, 2001).  An adversarial relationship is characterized 
by a competitive price-driven arrangement (Lamming, 1993), which is a common 
approach practiced in the commodity market.  On the opposite spectrum is the 
collaborative type of relationship, which has received considerable academic 
attention (Monczka, Petersen, Handfield, and Ragatz, 1998).  A collaborative 
relationship is characterized by close cooperation between a buyer and a selected 
group of suppliers typically based on a long-term agreement.   
The buyer and supplier in a strategic relationship typically align their 
goals closer compared to the buyer and supplier in an adversarial relationship, 
leading to less goal incongruence between them.  Research has shown that goal 
congruence has been found to reduce the opportunistic behavior (Parkhe, 1993) 
and decrease perceptions of exchange hazards (Deeds and Hill, 1999).  Further, in 
order to build a deeper supplier relationship, the buying company would typically 
invest in knowing the supplier firm’s background, including past performance.  It 
is less likely for them to select a supplier with excessive opportunistic behavior. 
Trust is one of the most salient characteristics associated with the 
collaborative buyer-supplier relationship (Johnson, 2004; (Amabile et al., 2001; 
Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Goodman et al, 1998; Monge & Contractor, 2003; 
Powell, 1990; Smith, Carroll & Ashford, 1995; all via Johnson (2004), Chen, 
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Paulraj, and Lado, 2004).  In a collaborative relationship, the buyer and supplier 
have high-level trust with each other. For this study, trust is used as a proxy for 
collaborative buyer-supplier relationship. 
Research has shown that trust in a collaborative relationship tempers the 
buyer’s opportunism or the possibility of intentionally abusing its power of being 
the bridge.  The result is a more transparent information flow between the supplier 
and the buyer (Balakrishnan, Mohan, and Seshadri, 2008).  Fewer “surprises” 
would occur in the resulting contractual relationship among the supplier, the 
buyer, and the buyer’s customer.  Thus the following hypothesis is put forward: 
 
H1a:  Buyer-supplier trust negatively moderates the effect of H1 such that the 
effect of H1 is weaker when there is a high level of buyer-supplier trust. 
 
 
 Lastly, the effect of bridge transfer is not universal across all services 
types.  While it holds for customer facing services, it does not hold for quasi-
manufacturing type of services.  In quasi-manufacturing, on the contrary to pure 
services, there is no direct contact between the end customers and the service 
suppliers post services outsourcing arrangements.  Therefore, the linkage between 
services suppliers and the buyer’s customers does not exist in this context.  The 
supplier firm will not be able to assume the powerful bridge position post services 
outsourcing arrangements.  Furthermore, due to the lack of customer inputs in 
quasi-manufacturing, there is a low degree of variability and uncertainty in the 
service creation process.  It is easier for the buyer firm to estimate task difficulties 
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and complexities.  Therefore, it leaves less room for the supplier firm to game the 
system.  Thus the following hypothesis is put forward: 
 
H1’:  The effect associated with H1 is not found in the outsourcing of quasi-
manufacturing services. 
 
 
Although the effect of bridge transfer on contract cost increases does not 
apply to the quasi-manufacturing setting, the effect of buyer-supplier relationship 
is still salient in this context.  Past research in incomplete contract theory has 
shown that there are elements in a contract that is difficult or impossible to 
specify (Bakos and Brynjyolfsson, 1993) and investments in buyer-supplier trust 
can effectively contain any opportunistic behaviors of the supplier firm for these 
uncontractible items.  Thus the following hypothesis is put forward: 
 
H1a’:  Buyer-supplier trust is negatively correlated to contract cost increases in 
the outsourcing of quasi-manufacturing services. 
 
2.3.2 The Impact of Bridge Transfer on Buyer’s Cost of Quality 
 
 Cost of quality refers to the “total cost incurred by (a) investing in the 
prevention of nonconformance to requirements, (b) apprising a product or service 
for conformances to requirements, and (c) failing to meet requirements.  
(Campanella, 1999, page 4).  Cost of quality is one of the key variables of interest 
in operations management and it has received a lot of attention in the operations 
management field over the past two decades (Omachonu, Suthummanon and 
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Einspruch, 2004; Crosby, 1983; Campanella, 1987a; Plunkett and Dale (1986, 
1987, 1988); Campanella (1987b), Feigenbaum (1991), Carr (1992), Gray (1995), 
Diallo et al. (1995), Johnson (1995), Willis and Willis (1996) quoted in Grimm, 
1987, pp. 397-412) Harrington, (1987, 1999), Robinson (1997), Shah and Fitzroy 
(1998), Gryna (1999), Dale (1999), Dale and Plunkett (1999), Campanella (1999) 
and Griffith (2003).   
 There are three major components of cost of quality: prevention costs, 
appraisal costs and failure cost (Juran, 1962; Freigenbau, 1991; Baiman et al, 
2000; etc).  Prevention cost refers to all activities specifically designed to prevent 
poor quality in products or services.  Some examples of prevention costs in a 
services setting are costs of services review, quality planning, supplier quality 
surveys, process quality evaluations, quality improvement team meetings, quality 
improvement projects, quality education and training (Campanella, 1999).  
Appraisal costs are costs associated with measuring, evaluating or auditing 
products or services to assure conformance to quality standards and performance 
requirements.  Some examples of appraisal costs are the costs of in-process and 
final inspection; product, process or service audits.  Failure costs are costs 
resulting from services not conforming to requirements or customer/user needs.  
Failure costs are divided into internal and external failure cost categories.  Internal 
failure costs occurring prior to delivery or shipment of the product, or the 
furnishing of a service, to the customer.  In a services outsourcing context, as 
stated earlier, the service suppliers will be in direct contact with the buyer’s 
customers during the service delivery process and there is no ready measure for a 
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quality check prior to the service delivery.  Therefore, internal failure cost does 
not apply to services outsourcing case.  External failure costs occurs after delivery 
of services to the customer.  Examples are the costs of processing customer 
complaints, customer returns and warranty claims (Campanella, 1999).   
The extant research on cost of quality is primarily manufacturing driven 
and typically examines how manufacturing firms can ensure quality products, 
what is the cost of “no quality” and the trade-off between quality investments and 
costs of no quality (Feigenbaum, 1956; Juran, 1951, 1962; 1988; etc).  Besides 
investigating the dynamics of cost of quality within a firm, a few studies also 
extended it to inter-firm setting and examined the implication of manufacturing 
outsourcing on cost of quality (Baiman et al, 2000).   
Two gaps have been observed in the extant literature.  One is that the 
existing cost of quality categories are manufacturing specific and do not fit 
services outsourcing context very well.  In this study, the cost of quality 
categories and measurement items that are appropriate for services setting context 
were derived.  More importantly, the existing research is dyadic (buyer-supplier) 
at best and omitted the dynamics at the triadic level (buyer-supplier-customer). 
This sole focus on the dyadic link between the service buyer and the service 
supplier is not sufficient for cost of quality concerns in a services outsourcing 
context.  Maltz and Ellram (1997) proposed that the total cost of the relationship 
in logistics outsourcing decisions should consider both the costs of monitoring the 
service buyer and logistics service suppliers’ interface and logistics service 
suppliers and end customer interface.  It calls for an examination beyond the 
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dyadic linkage between service buyers and service suppliers.  This research 
answers this call by investigating the impact of the buyer-customer link on the 
buyer’s cost of quality.  In other words, what happens to the buyer firm’s cost of 
quality when the buyer firm takes a hands-off approach and relies entirely on its 
supplier to take care of its customer was examined.  
 Specifically, appraisal cost, prevention cost and external failure costs are 
examined.  Internal failure cost is excluded because it does not apply to a services 
outsourcing setting.  (Service operation is carried out in front of customers so 
there is no internal quality check mechanism to catch the failure prior to its 
delivery to the final customers, as commonly used in the manufacturing setting).   
It is believed the triadic structure of bridge transfer will impact all of the three 
relevant categories of cost of quality for the service buyer firm.     
 When the service buyer firm takes a hands-off approach to the outsourced 
services and relies entirely on its suppliers to take care of the end customers, it 
makes quality appraisal very difficult.  From the services operation literature it 
was noted that pure services entail a large amount of customer inputs and 
therefore it is difficult to be standardized and/or measured (Schonberger, 1980; 
Levitt, 1981).  Further, service quality is defined as the gap between customer’s 
quality expectation and perceptions.  Since each customer has his/her own unique 
expectations and perceptions, it makes the service quality evaluation difficult.  
Therefore, the key to service quality measurements and evaluation is a thorough 
understanding of the customers’ needs.  This is only possible if the service buyer 
firm is in direct and constant contact with its end customers.  When bridge 
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transfer occurs, there is a breakage between the service buyer and buyer’s 
customers.  As a result, the service buyer firm will not be in tune with the needs 
and expectations from its end customers.  This makes the measurement and 
evaluation of service quality difficult.  Thus, the buyer’s costs associated with 
service appraisal will increase. 
 Prevention cost refers to all activities specifically designed to prevent poor 
quality in products or services.  Some examples of prevention costs in a services 
setting are costs of services review, quality planning, supplier quality surveys, 
process quality evaluations, quality improvement team meetings, quality 
improvement projects, quality education and training (Campanella, 1999).  
Similar to service appraisal costs, without a thorough knowledge of customers’ 
needs and expectations, it is difficult for the buyer firm to design a quality 
prevention program.  Thus bridge transfer increases prevention cost as well. 
 External failure costs occurs after delivery of services to the customer.  
Examples are the costs of processing customer complaints, customer returns and 
warranty claims (Campanella, 1999).  Bridge transfer has two negative effects on 
service recovery.  First, it increases the total number of service failures and 
secondly, it increases the unit cost associated with each service recovery.  
Previous research has found that there is an inverse relationship between appraisal 
cost, prevention cost and failure cost (Omachonu, Suthummanon and Einspruch, 
2004). When it is difficult to prevent service failure, there will be more 
occurrences of quality problems.  
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 The disconnect between the service buyer firm and the buyer’s customers 
also increases the unit costs associated with service recovery.  Bridge transfer 
makes it difficult to detect the service failure point and trigger timely service 
recovery responds.  Research has shown that the speed of service recovery 
matters (Hart et al, 1990; Miller, Craighead and Karwan, 2000).  A service failure 
is more effective when the problem is solved promptly.  In fact, Hart et al. (1990) 
posited that the ideal timing to identify and solve a service problem is before the 
customer becomes aware of it.  When there is a disconnect between the service 
buyer firm and the buyer’s customer, it slows down the service recovery speed 
and misses the ideal timing for service recovery.  In addition, without a thorough 
knowledge of customer needs, it is difficult to know the content of the service 
recovery that would please its customers.  In summary, bridge transfer will 
increase the appraisal cost, prevention costs and service recovery costs associated 
with service outsourcing.  Thus, the following hypothesis is put forward: 
 
H2: In the context of outsourcing of pure service, bridge transfer is positively 
correlated to the buyer’s cost of quality.  
  
 Further, buyer-supplier trust would moderate the impact of bridge transfer 
on buyer’s cost of quality.  When the service buyer and service supplier engage in 
a trusting relationship, the service buyer firm can rely on the service supplier firm 
to communicate any quality problem openly and in a timely fashion.   It is also 
linked to buyer-supplier commitment to work together for quality prevention and 
improvement projects.  In a way, buyer-supplier trust complements the disconnect 
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between the service buyer firm and its end customers.  The supplier becomes a 
reliable extension of the service buyer firm and thus reduces the buyer’s cost of 
quality.  Thus, the following hypothesis is put forward: 
 
H2a:  Buyer-supplier trust negatively moderates the effect of H2 such that the 
effect of H2 is weaker when there is a high level of buyer-supplier trust. 
 
 
The effect of H2 is not applicable to quasi-manufacturing type of services.  
In the quasi-manufacturing context, due to the lack of customer interaction, thus 
less variation, services operations can be standardized.  Much like in a 
manufacturing setting, a buyer can specify how long a given type of nail needs to 
be, a firm who outsources its payroll processing services can specify how many 
payroll forms need to be processed in a given timeframe.  Because of this 
standardization and reduced variation, for quasi-manufacturing services, service 
buyer firms can better monitor the service processes and design service quality 
improvement programs, with or without maintaining constant operational contacts 
with their customers.  They can also specify in the contract with more precision of 
what is required of the service supplier and can better gauge services outcomes.  
Continuing with our payroll processing example, the service buyer firm can 
evaluate suppliers’ work by the number of payroll processing errors.  This enables 
service buyers to put in preventive measures such as penalty clauses in their 
contract to punish suppliers for their service failures and thus effectively reducing 
external failures and the costs associated with them.  Again, due to the reduced 
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variability, this can be done with or without maintaining constant operational 
linkages with their customers.  Thus, the following hypothesis is put forward: 
 
H2’:  The effect associated with H2 is not found in the outsourcing of quasi-
manufacturing services. 
 
 
Although the effect of bridge transfer on buyer’s cost of quality does not 
apply to the quasi-manufacturing setting, the effect of buyer-supplier trust is still 
salient in this context.  Past research has shown the direct and moderating effects 
of buyer-supplier trust on buyer’s quality practices and quality performance 
(Fynes and Voss, 2002).  When buyer firms and supplier firms engage in a 
trusting relationship, the cost to monitor the supplier firm will reduce.  Further, it 
will reduce the external failure costs due to improved quality performance.  Thus, 
the following hypothesis is put forward: 
 
H2a’:  Buyer-supplier trust is negatively correlated to the cost of quality of the 
buyer firm in the outsourcing of quasi-manufacturing services. 
 
 
2.3.3 The Impact of Bridge Transfer on Customer Satisfaction 
 
Lastly, this research examined service quality which is an important factor 
in services (Anderson et al, 1994; Bitner and Brown, 2006; Rust and Zahorik, 
1993; Anderson and Sullivan, 1993; etc.).  Service quality perception measures 
how a given service supplied by a company meets or exceeds customer 
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expectations (Zeithamal and Bitner, 1996; Parasuraman, Zeithamal and Berry, 
1985).   
 Similar to the previous two services outsourcing outcomes, research in 
services quality perception mainly focused on how service providers can satisfy 
the end customer.  Tate, Ellram and Brown (2009) expanded the research scope 
and proposed a stakeholder perspective where the expectation of outsourced 
services came from suppliers, business units, supply management and end 
customers and they assessed how a buying firm and supplier work together to 
meet these expectations. Similar to Tate et al (2009), this study stresses that the 
service supplier-end customer link is not the only important link that contributes 
to service quality.  This research honed in on the service buyer-end customer link 
and examines the strength of this specific link on service quality perception. 
The service quality offered to buyer’s end customers is likely to drop if the 
service buyer firm takes a hands-off approach to the outsourced services and stop 
communicating with the end-customers, thus creating a structural hole between 
them.  For pure service that entails a high degree of customer contact and thus a 
high degree of variability and uncertainty, it is very difficult to standardize, 
measure and specify services quality into contracts (Schonberger, 1980; Levitt, 
1981).  As the old saying goes, you cannot manage what you cannot measure.   
This “un-measurability” leaves room for further gaming behavior of the service 
supplier firm.  When bridge transfer happens, the service supplier firm, 
strategically positioned in the path of communication between the service buyer 
firm and its end-customers, can play off the buyer and the end customers by 
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offering lower quality service to save costs.  Service quality is shown to be 
closely related to customer satisfaction (Taylor and Baker, 1994; Cronin, Brady 
and Hult, 2000; Cronin and Taylor, 1992; etc.).  Low service quality will decrease 
customer satisfaction.   
However, service quality and customer satisfaction degradation is less 
likely if the service buyer firm is actively monitoring its customers and 
communicating directly with its customers, thus, effectively stopping bridge 
transfer from occurring.  In this case, the buyer would have instant feedback on 
quality problems and customer satisfaction ratings and could exert influence on 
the supplier via contractual terms.   
This study examines service quality perception for the customer node in 
the services outsourcing triad instead of directly examining customer satisfaction.  
Past research has shown a very close relationship between service quality 
perception and customer satisfaction (Cronin and Taylor, 1992).  Further, research 
has confirmed the sequencing effects between these two constructs, i.e., one must 
first form a service quality perception before forming an emotional response of 
satisfaction (Cronin and Taylor, 1992).  To test the effects of bridge transfer on 
service quality, the following hypothesis is put forward: 
 
H3: In the context of outsourcing of pure services, bridge transfer is negatively 
correlated with the service quality end customers received. 
 
 
Buyer-supplier relationship would also moderate the impact of bridge 
transfer on service quality and customer satisfaction.  Trust in a collaborative 
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relationship tempers the buyer’s opportunism or the possibility of intentionally 
abusing its power of being the bridge.  When the service buyer and service 
supplier engage in a collaborative relationship, the supplier is entrusted to offer a 
consistent level of services to its customers and ensure a high level of customer 
satisfaction (Balakrishnan, Mohan, and Seshadri, 2008).   Similarly, an 
adversarial relationship between the service supplier and the service buyer 
enhances the service supplier’s opportunistic tendency of lowering service 
quality, leading to a low level of customer satisfaction.  Thus the following 
hypothesis is put forward: 
 
H3a:  Buyer-supplier relationship negatively moderates the effect of H3 such that 
the effect of H3 is weaker when there is a high level of buyer-supplier trust. 
 
Lastly, the effect of bridge transfer on service quality is not applicable to 
the outsourcing of quasi-manufacturing.  In quasi-manufacturing setting, due to its 
less variability and high level of measurability, with or without constant 
operational linkage the buyer firms can easily spot quality problems and 
implement penalty clause in the contract to penalize suppliers for their quality 
problems.  Thus, the following hypothesis is put forward: 
H3’:  The effect associated with H3 is not found in the outsourcing of quasi-
manufacturing services. 
 
Similar to the line of arguments for H1a’ and H2a’, although the effect of 
bridge transfer on service quality does not apply to the quasi-manufacturing 
setting, the effect of buyer-supplier trust is still salient in this context.  Buyer-
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supplier trust is shown to have direct and moderating effects of suppliers’ quality 
offering (Fynes and Voss, 2002; Goffin, Lemke and Szwejczewski, 2006).  When 
buyer firms and supplier firms engage in a trusting relationship, the supplier’s 
quality performance will improve.  Thus, the following hypothesis is put forward: 
 
H3a’:  Buyer-supplier trust is positively correlated to the service quality of the 
supplier firm in the outsourcing of quasi-manufacturing services. 
 
In this chapter, the impacts of bridge transfer on outsourcing outcomes for 
customer facing pure services and for quasi-manufacturing types of services are 
hypothesized separately.  In addition, the role of buyer-supplier trust is 
hypothesized.  Figure 2-6 in the next page depicted the operationalized models for 
this study.  In the next chapter, the methodology used to test these hypotheses will 
be discussed.   
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Figure 2-6a. The Effect Model (the Impacts of Bridge Transfer on Services 
Outsourcing Outcomes in the Context of Customer Facing Pure Services) 
 
 
 
Figure 2-6b. The No-Effect Model (the Impacts of Bridge Transfer on 
Services Outsourcing Outcomes in the Context of Quasi-Manufacturing 
Services) 
 
FIGURE 2-6. Operationalized Models for Hypothesis Testing 
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Chapter 3 
METHODOLOGY 
This section serves three purposes.  First, data collection method is 
explained.  Then, the operationalization of key constructs is described.  Lastly, 
data analysis approach is discussed. 
3.1 Data Collection 
 
In this sub-section, data collection method, the unit of observation, unit of 
analysis and context of analysis are addressed.  Then sample selection is 
described. 
3.1.1 Survey Method 
 
This study utilized a survey as the primary mode of data collection.  
Questionnaires measuring the key model constructs (triadic structure, type of 
services, buyer-supplier relationships and outsourcing outcomes) were developed 
based on existing literature (social network theory, service operations and buyer-
supplier relationship) and the theoretical definitions of these constructs.  These 
questionnaires were pilot-tested with MBA students for face validity and then 
tested with business executives who had had services outsourcing experiences and 
modified accordingly.  Then a final version was distributed to selected companies 
affiliated with CAPS Research and the Institute of Supply Management (ISM).   
The distribution of the questionnaires to CAPS affiliated firms has gone 
through two steps.  In step one, 131 email invitations were sent to Chief 
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Purchasing Officers (CPO) of firms affiliated with CAPS research to ask if 1) 
They had outsourced any service functions prior to September, 2007; 2) They 
were willing to cooperate with our research.  If so, we also asked the CPOs to 
nominate employees within their organizations who were familiar with their 
services outsourcing initiatives and were able to answer questions regarding the 
key constructs of our study.  As the result of step one, 40 employee contacts were 
identified. 
In the second step, questionnaires were sent out to the target employees 
nominated by their CPOs in addition to contacts from firms affiliated to ISM.  
Altogether 2690 emails were sent out.  Out of these firms, an estimate of 48% of 
the firms did not outsource services (based on Tate and Ellram, 2006).  The 
effective number of emails sent out was then reduced to 1291.  This number was 
used to compute response rate.   
Two reminder emails were sent out to the target firms, each time 
extending the deadline to 3 more weeks.  After the second extension, 120 
responses were received.  This number increased to160 after the third and final 
extension.  The response rate was 12.39% (based on the estimate of effective 
number of emails sent).  To assess respondent bias, a set of 27 ANOVAs were run 
to compare the responses for key dependent and independent constructs across the 
early respondents and late respondents.  The p-values for these 27 ANOVAs 
ranged from .073  to .961, none of them were statistically significant at the .05 
level.  Therefore, respondent bias was not of a major concern. 
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Four of the 160 responses were disregarded due to missing data.  Off the 
remaining 156 responses, 50 of them were related to the outsourcing of pure 
services.  Eighty-seven of the 156 responses were related to outsourcing of quasi-
manufacturing type of services.  The rest of the responses were related to mixed-
services and were disregarded (n=19).  Mixed services comingle characteristics of 
pure services and quasi-manufacturing and therefore do not allow a clean 
separation of the effects. 
3.1.2 Sample Descriptive 
 
Table 3-1 broke down the observations by industry.  Overall, observations 
from firms affiliated with CAPS Research and ISM covered a wide range of 
industries (27) including aerospace (n=15), health care (n=12), industrial 
manufacturing (n=11), pharmaceutical (n=9), etc.   
 
Tale 3-1  
Sample Observations by Industry 
 
Industry 
 
Total Number of Obs. 
 
Percentage 
 
Aerospace and 
Defense 
 
15 
9.55% 
Automotive and 
Transport 
4 
2.55% 
Business Services 2 1.27% 
Chemical 3 1.91% 
Computer Hardware 3 1.91% 
Computer Software 2 1.27% 
Computer Products 7 4.46% 
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Manufacturers 
Diversified Foods & 
Beverages 
3 
1.91% 
DOE/NNSA 
Contractors 
3 
1.91% 
Electronics 3 1.91% 
Engineering and 
Construction 
3 
1.91% 
Financial Services 8 5.10% 
Health Care Services 12 7.64% 
Higher Education 2 1.27% 
Industrial 
Manufacturing 
11 
7.01% 
Leisure, Lodging & 
Restaurants 
1 
0.64% 
Media 1 0.64% 
Metal and Mining 4 2.55% 
Pharmaceutical 9 5.73% 
Retail 5 3.18% 
Semiconductor 7 4.46% 
Telecommunication 
Equipment 
3 
1.91% 
Telecommunication 
Services 
2 
1.27% 
Utility 4 2.55% 
Petroleum 2 1.27% 
Other 37 24.20% 
Total 156 100.00% 
 
 
3.1.3 Unit of Observation, Unit of Analysis and Context of Analysis 
 
The unit of observation is the “thing” on which measurements are 
originally taken (Knapp, 1982).  For this study, the majority of the variables were 
observed at each outsourcing instance level.   
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The unit of analysis for this study was at the outsourcing instance level.  It 
purposely stayed away from the firm level to avoid extrapolation.  Each 
outsourcing instance has its unique characteristics such as the type of service 
being outsourced, the level of trust between team members from the buyer firm 
and the supplier firm, the triadic relationship arrangements, etc.  What happens to 
one outsourcing instance may or may not represent the outcome of another 
instance and it certainly does not represent the outcome at the firm level.  This is 
especially true in large corporations with many relatively independent divisions.  
The Hewlett-Packard (HP) Company offers a good example of the independent 
nature of divisions.  HP has four relatively independent branches: the Imaging 
Group, the Personal Computer Group, the Server Group and HP Services.  Within 
each branch, there are many high-level independent organizations.  In fact, in 
2006, there were over 200 sub-organizations within HP that had Executive Vice 
President (VP) level appointments.  These organizations all had their own 
decision making capabilities, including the decision to outsource.  In situations 
like this, what one team did may not have any impact on another team within a 
different department of a different division.  For example, the outcome of one 
outsourcing instance in the IS department within the Personal Computing 
Division may not have any impact on the outcome of another outsourcing instance 
in the R&D Department within the Imaging Division.  Therefore, it is 
inappropriate to analyze instance level data and derive conclusions at the firm 
level.   
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Although services outsourcing initiatives, specifically, the substitution 
type of outsourcing can happen to every firm, they are most prevalent in large 
corporations.  This is due to the fact that large organizations are more likely to 
branch out to many functional units and later have the need to substitute its 
internal functions by external vendors.  (Small firms typically use abstention 
outsourcing due to the lack of capabilities).  This is why we should constrain our 
level of analysis at an instance level to deal with the independent nature of 
decision making within large firms.  This does not mean our results do not 
generalize to small firms.  For small firms that only have one outsourcing 
instance, it is still at each outsourcing instance level except there may only be one 
instance for that firm, in which case, the firm level data may be equal to instance 
level data.  
 The context of analysis refers to the framework in which the analysis is 
actually carried out (Knapp, 1982).  This study examined outsourcing risks in the 
context of the triad of the service buyer, service supplier and the buyer’s 
customers.  As a triadic level construct, two implicit assumptions were made.  
One was that the buyer-supplier link remains post services outsourcing.  This was 
a reasonable assumption given that the buyer firm still pays the bill for the 
services rendered by the supplier firm.  The second was that the supplier-customer 
link remains post services outsourcing. This is consistent with the definition of 
pure services.  In pure services, the service supplier and the end customer have 
intense physical or virtual contacts (Chase, 1978; Frohle and Roth, 2004).  The 
two implicit assumptions ensured the existence of a triad in service outsourcing.  
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In this regard, our key independent construct, bridge transfer, was a triadic level 
construct.   
3.2 Operationalization of Variables 
 
 Five key constructs were included in the theoretical model.  Table 3-2 
below provided definitions of these constructs.  In the following section, the 
operationalization of these constructs is discussed, with particular attention pays 
to the construct of bridge transfer, which has not been examined or 
operationalized before. 
 
TABLE 3-2  
 
Definitions of Constructs 
 
Construct Definitions Reference 
Bridge 
Transfer 
 
Bridge transfer refers to the removal of the bridge 
status from one node and its simultaneous 
relocation to another node in a triadic network.  It 
encompasses the weakening and disappearing of 
operational ties between two previously connected 
actors and the appearing and strengthening of 
operational ties between two previously 
unconnected actors.  Further, the removal and the 
relocation of the bridge position needs to happen 
concurrently in order to maintain the triadic 
structure. 
 
In this study, bridge transfer is operationalized as 
the strength of operational ties between the service 
buyer firms and the buyers’ end customers in their 
primary task environment.  A primary task 
environment refers to the focal firms’ immediate 
suppliers and customers. 
 
Li and Choi, 2009; 
Anderson et al., 
1994.   
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Supplier’s 
Appropriati
on Behavior 
A supplier takes advantage of his/her customers’ 
dependence on him/her and thereby increases 
his/her part of the total end customer revenues.   
 
In this study, it refers to the tendency of suppliers 
to increase contract costs above and beyond the 
buyers’ expectations. 
Walker (1988), 
Brindley (2004) 
Buyer’s 
Cost of 
Quality 
Total cost incurred by (a) investing in the 
prevention of nonconformance to requirements, 
(b) apprising a product or service for 
conformances to requirements, and (c) failing to 
meet requirements.  
Juran, 1962; 
Feigenbau, 1991; 
Baiman et al, 2000; 
Omachonu, 
Suthummanon and 
Einspruch, 2004; 
Crosby, 1983; 
Campanella (1999) 
and Griffith (2003), 
etc.   
Customer 
Satisfaction 
 
Customer satisfaction refers to how a given 
service supplied by a company meets or exceeds 
customer expectation.   
 
In this study, service quality perception was used 
as a proxy for customer satisfaction. 
 
 
Zeithamal and 
Bitner, 1996; 
Parasuraman, 
Zeithamal and 
Berry, 1985. 
Pure 
Service 
 
Pure services refer to operations where major 
production is carried out in the presence of the 
customers. 
 
 
Chase, (1977, 
1978,1981, 1983), 
etc. 
Quasi-
Manufacturi
ng 
 
Quasi-manufacturing services refer to operations 
where major production is carried out without the 
presence of the customers. 
 
 
Chase, (1977, 
1978,1981, 1983), 
etc. 
Buyer-
Supplier 
Partnership 
 
Purposive strategic relationships between the 
independent firms who share compatible goals, 
strive for mutual benefit, and acknowledge a high 
level of mutual interdependence. 
 
In this study, buyer-supplier trust was used as a 
proxy for buyer-supplier partnership. 
 
 
Mohr and 
Spekman, 1994. 
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3.2.1 Key Model Variables 
 
Bridge Transfer 
 
In the context of the triadic structure in services outsourcing, bridge 
transfer describes the state of the weakening and loss of operational connections 
between the service buyer firm and the buyer’s end customers and the 
establishment and strengthening of the operational connections to the service 
suppliers in their primary task environment (Li and Choi, 2009; Anderson et al, 
1994).  A primary task environment refers to the focal dyads’ immediate suppliers 
and customers (Anderson et al., 1994).   
Based on this description, we can see bridge transfer is closely related to 
the construct of “tie strength” (Granovetter, 1973; Wellman, 1982; Marsden and 
Campbell, 1984; Nelson, 1989; Krackhardt, 1992, etc.) For this study, tie strength 
is defined as the intensity of operational linkages between two firms.  Therefore, 
the degree of bridge transfer in services outsourcing setting is operationalized as 
varying levels of “tie strength” between a service buyer firm and the buyer’s end 
customers.  Since bridge transfer involves both the weakening and disappearing of 
operational ties between two previously connected actors and the appearing and 
strengthening of operational ties between two previously unconnected actors, an 
implicit assumption here is the establishment of operational ties between the 
service supplier firm and the end customers.  This assumption is supported by the 
definition of services operation, i.e., large amount of interaction between the 
service supplier and the end customer (Sampson and Froehle, 2006;  Gaither and 
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Frazier 1999; Sampson, 2001; Chase & Aquilano, 1977; Kellogg & Chase, 1995) 
and therefore is a reasonable assumption.  For this study, the focus is on the 
measurements of the tie strength between the service buyer firm and the buyer’s 
end customers. 
Existing Measurements of Tie Strength 
 
The measurement of tie strength for this study is built on existing 
literature.  The network literature has provided measures for tie strength at 
individual and project levels.  It has also offered a few examples of tie strength 
measurements at inter-organizational levels, though its application is limited to 
extended networks context and in binary settings (i.e., weak versus strong ties).  
The following paragraphs address existing measures of tie strengths at different 
levels of analyses and point out gaps in the existing literature.  Then common 
characteristics of tie strength construct across different levels of analyses will be 
derived. 
The concept of tie strength originated at interpersonal level of analysis 
(McEvily and Zaheer, 1999; Rindfleisch and Moorman, 2001; Granovetter, 1973; 
Nelson, 1983; Nelson, 1989; Reagans and McEvily, 2003).  A large amount of 
literature investigated the effects of social ties and varying degree of tie strength 
on career mobility (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999).  For example, Friedman and 
Krackhardt (1997) examined the career outcomes of Asian Immigrants and 
discovered a positive correlation between social capitals on improved career 
outcomes.  Similarly, Podolny and Baron (1997) found that “individual’s mobility 
is enhanced by having large, sparse network of informal ties for acquiring 
  71 
information and resources (p.673)”.  Here a spare network is a  synonymous for 
weak ties.  There are other studies at individual level that examined the impacts of 
tie-strengths in non-career settings such as in schools (Granovetter, 1983).   These 
studies contrasted the effects of weak ties versus strong ties.   It is commonly 
agreed that while strong ties builds trusting relationships, weak ties are more 
useful in promoting career advancement (Podolny and Baron, 1997 and many 
others). 
McEvily and Zaheer (1999) proposed that the concept of tie strength, 
although originated at individual level, works equally well at higher levels of 
analysis.  Indeed, in recent years, there have been studies of tie-strength at both 
intra and inter-organizational level as well as at industry cluster levels (Achrol 
and Kotler, 1999;Gulati, 1998; Hansen, 1999; McEvily and Zaheer, 1999; 
Rindfleisch and Moorman, 2001).    At firm level, Rindfleisch and Moorman 
examined the effects of tie strength on new product alliances.  Their finding 
suggested that strong tie enhances the acquisition and utilization of information in 
new product alliance.  On the other hand, McEvily and Zaheer (1999) noted that 
weak ties are good for access new information, ideas and opportunities within a 
competitive networks.  Finally, Tiwana (2008) reconciled the differences and 
pointed out the complementary nature of  strong ties and weak ties in innovation-
seeking alliances.  While weak tie can provide knowledge potentials, strong ties 
can provide integration capacities. 
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Gap in Existing Measurements 
 
 A careful review of the existing literature on the measurement of tie-
strength revealed three gaps.  First, tie strength measurement has been largely 
used at individual level of analysis (Granovettor, 1979; 1982; Nelson, 1983; 
Nelson, 1989; Reagans and McEvily, 2003 and many more).  For a few studies 
that applied this construct at firm level, it was used mostly in a network setting 
(McEvily and Zaheer, 1999; Rindfleisch and Moorman, 2001).  It does not 
address the unique situation in services outsourcing where we have a focused 
triadic relationship structures among the buyer firm, the supplier firm and the 
buyer’s end-customers.   A triadic structure differs from a network structure in 
that many network level tie strength indicators such as network density and 
network distance do not apply at the triadic level.  Yet triadic structure, being the 
fundamental block making up a social network, deserves much more attention 
(Madhavan, Gnyawali and He, 2004).  Madhavan et al (2004) argues that triadic 
structure is “an important , but neglected aspect of interfirm networks” (p. 918) 
because it is strategically placed between the dyadic level of analysis we are used 
to and the higher-order network level analysis.   
Secondly, tie strength measurement has been used almost exclusively as a 
binary variable, i.e., weak versus strong.  Yet the treatment of tie strength is more 
of a “customary” rather than a must (Brown and Reigen, 1987; Krackhardt, 
1992;).  For example, in Brown and Reigen (1987)’s research on social ties and 
word-of-mouth referral behavior, the researchers collected measurements of tie 
strength indicators such as communication frequency at ordinal level.  They then 
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arbitrarily split the data into two groups (strong ties versus weak ties).  They 
justified their approach as “customary in the research on this topic” (page 350).  
There is no real theoretical justification of why this has to be done.  This study 
sets out to measure tie strength as a continuous variable to capture the richness of 
information contained in varying levels of data values. 
Thirdly, the existing tie strength measurements focused on innovation 
contexts (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999; Rindfleisch and Moorman, 2001, etc.).  
There has not been any research that can apply to services outsourcing context.  
This research attempts to fill in this gap.  It sets out to derive a firm level 
measurement scale that is generic enough (not tied to a specific industry) for 
services outsourcing context and reflects the degree of connections in a 
continuous fashion. 
Deriving an Empirical Measurement Scale for Tie Strength 
 
The existing network literature provides clues to the key indicators of tie 
strength.  At the individual level of analysis, the frequency of contact has often 
been used as a proxy of tie strength (Podolny and Baron, 1997; Reagans and 
McEvily, 2003; Granovetter, 1973; Nelson, 1983; 1989).  Other factors such as 
the presence of friendship and reciprocity are found to be closely related to the 
frequency of contact (Reagans and McEvily, 2003; Nelson, 1983, 1989).  In 
addition, the emotional intensity and the intimacy (mutual confiding) are 
considered other indicators of tie strength (Granavettor, 1979; Marsden and 
Campbell, 1984; Krackhardt in Networks and Organizations: Structure, Form and 
Action edited by Nohria and Eccles, 1992).   
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Tie strength measurements at team and intra-organizational levels has also 
been discussed.  In Tiwana (2008), tie strength at project levels was measured on 
a 5 items scale: 1) there is close, personal interaction among team members at 
multiple levels; At multiple levels, this project team is characterized by : 2) high 
reciprocity among members, 3) mutual trust among members; 4) mutual respect 
among members; 5) personal friendship between members.  It is very obvious that 
these team-level measures have their roots in individual level indicators, i.e., the 
emphasis on interaction, reciprocity, mutual trust and friendships. 
Tie-strength indicators at both inter-organizational level and industry 
cluster levels (Achrol and Kotler, 1999;Gulati, 1998; Hansen, 1999; McEvily and 
Zaheer, 1999; Rindfleisch and Moorman, 2001) have some resemblance to their 
individual level counter-parts but there are also differences.  For example, 
McEvily and Zaheer (1999) measured firm-level tie strength with “infrequency of 
interactions”, “geographic dispersion” and “non redundancy” (p. 1145) which 
resembles individual level indicators.  However, relationship intimacy, an 
inherent individual level construct, is not applicable to firm level (Granovetter, 
1983).   Researchers measured relational embeddedness (Rindfleisch and 
Moorman, 2001) instead.  Rindfleisch and Moorman (2001) derived a four item 
scale that measured relational embeddedness among industry alliances in New 
Product Development settings.  This scale includes indicators such as 
“indebtedness”, “close social relations”, “mutual gratifying” and intention for 
future collaboration.   
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Following Brown and Reingen (1987), this research actively distinguishes 
the form of connection and the content of connection.  Brown and Reingen (1987) 
distinguished tie strength from tie content where tie strength represents the 
relational form and tie content represents the relational content.  This distinction 
nicely captured the various key indicators of tie strength at the organizational 
level, as expressed by existing literature.  The relational form represents the 
intensity aspect of tie strength, which can be measured by frequency, duration and 
quality of interactions.  Some examples of such contacts are setting up meetings, 
exchanging email or telephone conversations.  This aspect of tie strength is 
consistent with the classic tie strength literature across various levels 
(Granovetter, 1973: Marsden and Hurlbert, 1988; Burt, 1992).  The relational 
content refers to the routine key operation steps involved in services production.  
An example of the key steps includes soliciting user requirements.   
While the author agrees with Brown and Reingen’s theoretical distinction 
of these two dimensions, I argue that relational form (tie strength) does not exist 
separate from relational content.   In other words, when tie strength is measured, it 
has to be the strength of some content, i.e., the strength of content A vs. the 
strength of content B.  Tie strength does not exist in vacuum.  Therefore, instead 
of treating tie strength and tie contents as two unique concepts, this study 
embedded tie contents (operational linkage) into the measurement of tie strength 
and only addressed tie strength of a specific content.   
The content of the tie in this study is the operational linkages between the 
services buying firms and the end customers.  Operational linkage refers to a set 
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of routine interfirm interactions necessary to carry out operational tasks.  
Examples of these interactions can include gathering user requirements, 
monitoring service delivery process and soliciting user feedback.  Based on the 
operational linkages between the service buyer firm and the buyer’s customers at 
each key touch points of  a service design and production process, a set of items 
were developed to measure the strength of operational ties between the service 
buyer and the buyer’s customers.  These measures contained both direct 
measurement of operational tie strength between service buyer firms and the 
buyers’ end customers and indirect measurements.  The indirect measurements 
refer to the reliance of the buyer firms on the service supplier firms to provide 
information regarding the end customers.  This initial set of measurements 
contained 10 items and was further purified to 5 items for parsimony reasons and 
based on the amount of variance extracted.  The respondents were required to rate 
them on a Likert-like scale of 6 points ranging from completely disagree (1) to 
completely agree (6).  These 5 items include both direct measurements of tie-
strength and indirect measurements.  One example of the direct measurement 
items is “we regularly send out satisfaction surveys to our customer on outsourced 
services (reverse-scored)”.  On example of the indirect measurement items is “We 
relied on our supplier to obtain the latest user requirements.”  For a list of these 
items, please refer to Table 3-3 at the end of this section. 
Tie strength in this study is treated as a continuous variable.  The choice of 
treating tie strength as a continuous variable instead of a binary variable (weak vs. 
strong) is to guard against possible uneven sample sizes.  Uneven sample size for 
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categorical data can create a problem on the robustness of the analytical results.  
Treating tie strength as a continuous variable can avoid this problem. 
Buyer-Supplier Relationship 
 
 The buyer-supplier relationship is measured as a continuous variable.  In a 
way, the degree of the buyer-supplier partnership is measured.  Since buyer-
supplier trust is a salient characteristic in a collaborative buyer-supplier 
relationship (Pruitt, 1981; Williamson, 1985; Zand, 1972; Anderson and Narus, 
1990; Mohr and Spekman, 1994; etc), it was used as a proxy for collaborative 
relationship in this study.  While existing literature offered many dimensions of 
trust, for this study, trust in trading partner’s honesty was used as it is closely 
related to opportunistic behavior.  A 3-item scale was adopted to measure this 
construct.  This is consistent with existing literature in trust in honesty 
measurements (Kwon and Suh, 2004; Bstieler, 2006).   
Supplier’s Appropriation Behavior 
 
 A supplier’s appropriation behavior was measured by the perceived 
increase in first term contract costs, repeat contracts costs and costs associated 
with changes to the existing contract (see table 3-3 for the exact measurement 
items used).  First term contract is a new contract prior to which service provision 
was either by in-house staff or not required at all (Domberger, Fernandez and 
Fiebig, 2000).  Repeat contracts are contracts that went beyond the first-period 
and have been renewed.  In addition, we also measured perceived increase 
associated with any change requests that buyers initiated.  An example of a 
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change request could be to increase the services scope currently offered by the 
suppliers.  In a call center setting, the buyer could have asked the suppliers to take 
over the second level customer support in addition to the first level support. 
 The reason we used the perceptual measure is its versatility.  Services 
outsourcing projects are diverse in their nature of work, scope of work and type of 
contract terms.  Some projects require highly specialized personnel (such as the 
second and third level support in a call center) and therefore may have a high 
price tag associated with it.  In addition, pricing arrangements vary.  According to 
a research by Domberger et al. (2000), the most common contracts used in 
services outsourcing are fixed contracts, flexible contracts and a hybrid contract 
form with a good representation of each type in the actual services outsourcing 
arrangements.  This diversity creates an obstacle for a unified “hard” contract 
price measure.  At the same time, perception measures from experienced contract 
personnel reflects the perceived degree of contract costs increase above and 
beyond their expectations and can act as a more uniform base for comparison. 
 The respondents were asked five questions regarding their perception of 
first contract price, repeat contract price and change request costs as well as 
overall perception of contract cost.  For overall contract cost, we asked both the 
direct perception and the perception of contract costs competitiveness across the 
industry.  An example of these 5 questions include: “At the time of contract 
renewal (if applicable), our service suppliers had increased the total contract costs 
above and beyond the inflation rate.” 
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Buyer’s Cost of quality 
 
Cost of quality categories include appraisal, prevention and failure costs 
(Gryna et al., 1999).  In Omachonu et al, 2004, they have operationalized each 
sub-category of cost of quality along three dimensions: human inputs, materials 
and machine.  For this study, only human inputs dimensions were adopted to fit 
the services context.  External failure costs occur after delivery of shipment of the 
product, and during or after furnishing of a service, to the customer.  This 
research operationalized the cost of external failure by the costs of service 
recovery.  Cost of service recovery refers to the costs associated with offering 
psychological and tangible compensations for real and perceived damages (Bell 
and Zemke, 1987; Miller, Craighead and Karwan, 2000).  Measurement items 
from both categories were created.  
The final scale for cost of quality was composed of 6 items incorporating 
three categories: monitor cost, prevention cost and external failure cost.  The 
exact items used are listed in table 3-3. 
Service Quality Perception 
 
Service quality perception was measured by a 7-item scale.  Respondents 
were asked their perception on 7 dimensions of service quality.   This is consistent 
with Parasuraman et al., 1985.  A composite score was then calculated for service 
quality perception. 
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3.2.2  Control Variables 
 
 The key control variables included company size in number of employees, 
company size in gross sales dollars, the type of customers (internal customers vs, 
external customers) and contract type (new contracts vs. renewal of existing 
contracts).  In addition, buyer-supplier relationship was a key control variable and 
was entered in the theoretical model for customer facing pure services.  (It is a 
key independent variable in the theoretical model for quasi-manufacturing type of 
services).  This study did not control for industry type because it covered a wide 
range of industries and because previous research has shown that in the context of 
research on outsourcing, industry type does not affect outsourcing outcomes 
(Daugherty, 1988; Loh and Venkatraman, 1992).   
3.3  Data Analysis 
 
 Data collected first when through a set of reliability analysis.  Then 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) was run to compute composite scores for 
each of the constructs.  Based on the composite scores, six separate multiple 
regressions were run to detect the main and interaction effects of the theoretical 
models in the context of customer facing pure services as well as in the context of 
quasi-manufacturing type of services.  Each step is briefly described below. 
3.3.1  Validation of the New Measurement Scale 
 
 Bridge transfer is a new construct and has not been operationalized prior 
to this study.  Therefore, construct validity is of our major concern.  Construct 
validity refers to “the correspondence between a construct (conceptual definition 
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of a variable) and the operational procedure to measure or manipulate that 
construct” (Schwab, 1980, p.5).  In a typical reflective construct paradigm, three 
essential components need to be established for construct validity: 
unidimensionality, reliability and validity (O’Leary-Kelly and Vokurka, 1998). 
However, as we later explain, the construct of bridge transfer is a formative 
construct and therefore does not fit into this paradigm.   
Formative construct refers to the conceptualization of a latent construct 
where observed variables are modeled as the cause (instead of reflection) of latent 
constructs (Howell et al, 2007).  As such, items within a scale that measure a 
formative construct do not have a requirement for high inter-item correlation.  
Rather, they are viewed as components of the construct.   
Three key constructs in the theoretical models, i.e., Bridge Transfer (BT), 
Contract Cost Increase (CostInc) and Cost of Quality (CostQua) are formative in 
nature.  Specifically, BT construct assesses the service buyer’s awareness of each 
of the key operational tasks such as defining user requirements, quality control 
and complaint handling.  The awareness of one task does not have to be highly 
correlated with the awareness of another task.  Yet collectively, they form an 
overall awareness score.  Similarly, Cost of quality is assessed by a multi-item 
scale that is composed of three different cost categories (i.e., monitoring cost, 
prevention cost and external failure costs).  Lastly, contract cost increase is a 
formative construct.  It measures cost increase at each of the potential key 
contract stages: renewal, change request and final price.  In the next few 
paragraphs, the three key aspects of construct validity for latent reflective 
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construct will be examined and explanation will be given as why they are not 
applicable measures for formative constructs. 
Unidimensionality requires the establishment of a set of empirical 
indicators loads onto one and only one construct (Gerbing and Anderson, 1988; 
O’Leary-Kelly and Vokurka, 1998).  This requirement does not work well with 
formative constructs where inter-item correlations are not always high.  In fact, in 
a way, low inter-item ratings are preferred for formative constructs, indicating 
these items representing different dimensions of the construct.  Therefore, 
unidimensionality was not assessed for the bridge transfer construct in this study. 
 Reliability refers to the consistency of a measure.  It indicates how far the 
measurement is free from random error (Bollen, 1989; Carmines and Zeller, 1979; 
O’Leary-Kelly and Vokurka, 1998).  For this study, the Cronbach α coefficient 
was used to compute reliability for buyer-supplier trust (BST) scale and service 
quality perception (ServQual) scale.  The Cronbach α coefficient  is regarded as 
one of the most popular methods for assessing reliability (Pedhazur and 
Schmelkin, 1991; Carmines and Zeller, 1979; O’Leary-Kelly and Vokurka, 1998).   
The Crobach’s alpha for BST was 0.945 and the Crobach’s alpha for ServQua 
was 0.941, providing evidence of reliability.   
However, Cronbach α coefficient computation depends highly on the 
inter-item correlations (Cortina, 1993) and therefore does not work well with 
formative construct.  For the other three key formative constructs in the 
theoretical models, i.e., Bridge Transfer (BT), Contract Cost Increase (CostInc) 
and Cost of Quality, no reliability assessment was performed. 
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The validity of a measure refers to “the degree to which the variance in the 
measure is attributed to variations in the variable and not some other factor” 
(O’Leary-Kelly and Vokurka, 1998, p. 399).  It encompasses two elements: 
convergent validity and discriminant validity (Campbell and Fiske, 1959).  
Convergent validity checks if items measuring the same construct loads together 
while discriminant validity checks if items measuring the same construct does not 
load onto other constructs (Campbell and Fiske, 1959).  Similar to earlier 
discussion on the unidimensionality and reliability of formative constructs, 
convergent validity and discriminant validity do not readily apply to formative 
constructs.   
3.3.2  Principal Component Analysis 
 
 Since each construct was measured by a multi-item scale, Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) was used to compute a composite score for each of 
them.  PCA is a data reduction technique that assigns a weight to each 
measurement according to its relative contribution to a component.  Compared to 
simply averaging each item within a scale to derive a mean score, PCA is more 
advantage in that its extraction maximizes the representation of a component. 
3.3.3  Linear Regression 
 
 Six linear regressions were run to test the main effect and moderation 
effects between the independent variable (the degree of bridge transfer), the 
moderating variable (level of buyer-supplier trust) and each of the three 
dependent variables (contract cost increase, cost of quality and service quality 
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perception). The control variables were included into the regression equation 
below.  Three of the regressions were run on pure services data.   
CostInc=BT*X1+Trust*X2+Interact*X3+Employ*X4+Sale*X5+CustType*x6+ContracType*X7 
CostQua=BT*X1+Trust*X2+Interact*X3+Employ*X4+Sale*X5+CustType*x6+ContracType*X7 
ServQua=BT*X1+Trust*X2+Interact*X3+Employ*X4+Sale*X5+CustType*x6+ContracType*X7 
The other three regressions were run on the quasi-manufacturing data.   
CostInc’=BT*X1+Trust*X2+Interact*X3+Employ*X4+Sale*X5+CustType*x6+ContracType*X7 
CostQua’=BT*X1+Trust*X2+Interact*X3+Employ*X4+Sale*X5+CustType*x6+ContracType*X7 
ServQua’=BT*X1+Trust*X2+Interact*X3+Employ*X4+Sale*X5+CustType*x6+ContracType*X7 
3.3.4.  Bootstrapping 
 
Although these observations were sufficient to provide partial support to 
the theoretical models, there was a concern over the accuracy of standard error 
estimation and confidence interval estimates.  Toward that end, bootstrapping was 
performed.  Bootstrapping is a “computationally intensive, non-parametric 
technique” (Mooney and Duval, 1993, p. 1) for making inference about 
population characteristics based on sample observations.  It involves a large 
amount of repetitive re-sampling, with replacements, of the original sample data 
(Mooney and Duval, 1993).  Bootstrapping has many advantages, one of which is 
that it has “superior small sample properties” (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000, 
p. 352) and is useful in hypothesis testing when the sample size is relatively small 
(King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000; Ader, Mellenbergh and Hand, 2008).  It 
accounts for “the distortions caused by the specific sample that may not be fully 
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representative of the population” (Ader et al, 2008, p 373). As such, bootstrap has 
been shown to improve error variances and confidence interval estimates 
(Felsenstein, 1985).  In addition, bootstrapping overcomes problems associated 
with the violations of distribution assumptions (such as normality assumptions).  
Mooney and Duval (1993) offered detailed description of this procedure. 
 
Table 3-3 
Constructs, Item Measurements and Related Literature 
 
Construct/item measure Source/construct 
Bridge Transfer 
 
Please rate the following statements pertaining to how you 
interfaced with your customers after your outsourced the services to 
your supplier.  1-Completely disagree     6-Completely agree 
 
 
Based on 
theoretical 
definition. 
BT1 We relied on our supplier to obtain the latest user 
requirements. 
Strength of 
Operational Tie 
BT2 After we outsourced our services to the supplier firm, we 
regularly surveyed our customers’ requirements on 
outsourced services*(reverse coded) 
 
BT3 We maintained close communication with our customers on 
the quality of the outsourced services*(reverse coded). 
 
BT4 We regularly sent out satisfaction surveys to our customers 
on outsourced services* (reverse coded) 
 
BT5 We responded to customer complaints directly* (reverse 
coded). 
 
  
 
Buyer-Supplier Trust 
 
Please rate the following statements on a scale of 1 to 6 with 1 
representing completely disagree and 6 completely agree. 
 
 
Paulraj et al., 
2008; 
BS1 We can count on the supplier to be honest in its dealings 
with us. 
Relational Trust 
BS2 The supplier is a firm that stands by its word. Relational Trust 
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BS5 The supplier can be counted on to do what is right. 
 
Relational Trust 
  
Supplier’s Appropriation Behavior 
 
Please rate the following statements on a scale of 1 to 6 with 1 
representing completely disagree and 6 completely agree. 
 
Domberger, 
Fernandez and 
Fiebig, 2000. 
BI1 For the outsourced services, we have paid more than what 
had been anticipated in the beginning. 
Appropriation 
Behavior 
BI2 At the time of contract renewal (if applicable), oru service 
suppliers had increased the total contract costs above and 
beyond the inflation rate. 
 
BI3 Whenever we had requested additional work not specified in 
the signed contract, the supplier charged us above and 
beyond our expectation. 
Appropriation 
Behavior 
B14 We felt we were charged a fair and reasonable amount of 
money for the services rendered by the supplier* (reverse 
coded). 
Appropriation 
Behavior 
BI5 Compared to our competitors, we paid less for the overall 
contracted services. 
Appropriation 
Behavior 
 
Buyer’s Cost of quality 
 
Please rate the following statements on a scale of 1 to 6 with 1 
representing completely disagree and 6 completely agree. 
 
 
Miller, 
Craighead 
and Karwan, 
2000 
 
CQ1 
 
After we outsourced the services to our supplier firm, we 
allocated a large amount of resource (money or employees’ 
time) to work on supplier quality review. 
 
Appraisal 
Cost 
CQ2 After we outsourced the services to our supplier firm, we 
allocated a large amount of resources (money or employees’ 
time) to work on quality improvement programs at the 
supplier’s site. 
Prevention 
Cost 
CQ3 We spent a large amount of time apologizing to our customers 
about services failures. 
Service 
Recovery 
Cost 
CQ4 We spent a large amount of time to fix services problems with 
the customers after the supplier rendered the services. 
Service 
Recovery 
Cost 
CQ5 We spent a large amount of resources on responding to 
customer complaints. 
Service 
Recovery 
Cost 
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CQ6 Overall, we spent a large amount of money on services 
recovery. 
Service 
Recovery 
Cost 
  
Service Quality Perception 
 
Please rate the following statements on a scale of 1 to 6 with 1 
representing completely disagree and 6 completely agree. 
 
Parasuraman 
et al, 1985. 
 
SQ1 
 
Generally, the supplier provided services reliably, consistently, 
and dependably. 
 
Service 
Quality 
Perception 
SQ2 Generally, the supplier was willing and able to provide 
services in a timely manner. 
Service 
Quality 
Perception 
SQ3 Generally, the supplier was competent (i.e., knowledgeable 
and skillful). 
Service 
Quality 
Perception 
SQ4 Generally, the supplier was approachable and easy to contact. Service 
Quality 
Perception 
SQ5 Generally, the supplier was courteous, polite and respectful. Service 
Quality 
Perception 
SQ6 Generally, the employees made the effort to understand our 
customers’ needs 
Service 
Quality 
Perception 
SQ7 Generally, the physical facilities and employees of our 
supplier’s firm were neat and clean. 
Service 
Quality 
Perception 
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Chapter 4 
RESULTS 
In this section, the results of the statistical analyses are presented.  First, 
results of PCA analyses are addressed.  Then assumptions and results of 
regression analyses are discussed. 
4.1 Principal Component Analysis 
 
 Since there are multiple items for each of the 5 key constructs, Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) was used to compute a composite score for each of 
them.  The analysis was run using SPSS version 19.0.0 and the extraction method 
was principal component extraction.  Only one component was extracted for each 
construct.  The percentage variance extracted was 53.021% for the bridge transfer 
construct, 90.672% for the buyer-supplier trust construct, 49.763% for the 
contract cost increase construct, 74.404% for the service quality construct and 
55.299% for the cost of quality construct.  The component scores were then saved 
and used as inputs into the subsequent linear regressions.  
4.2 Linear Regression  
 
 In this section, the results of the 6 linear regressions that tested the 
hypothesized theoretical frameworks are reported.  Prior to reporting the 
regression results, the evaluation of the normality assumption are presented. 
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4.2.1 Normality Assessment 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was conducted to assess the normality of the 
composites scores.  The p-value for the normality assessment was .200 for the 
bridge transfer composite, .200 for the cost of quality construct, .174 for the 
service quality construct, indicating no major problems with normality for these 
three constructs.  The p-value for buyer-supplier trust construct was .047 and for 
contract cost increase construct was .023, indicating moderate problems with 
normality. Bootstrapping was then performed to account for the moderate 
violation to the normality assumption.  Results of the bootstrapping are discussed 
later in this chapter. 
4.2.2 Regression Results 
 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression analyses with list wise deletion 
were performed using SPSS version 19.0.0.  Below the results of these analyses 
on sample data sets are reported.  Further, the results of bootstrapping are 
reported.   
Regression on Contract Cost Increase for the Pure Service Model  
 
Table 4-1 presented the regression results on contract cost increase of the 
customer facing pure services model when all control variables were included.  
Specifically, BT_operation refers to the degree of bridge transfer construct: the 
higher the number, the higher the degree of bridge transfer.  BSREL refers to the 
degree of buyer-supplier trust: the higher the number, the higher the buyer trusts 
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the supplier firm.  Interactionterm refers to the interaction between BT_operaiton 
and BSREL: the higher the number, the more the increase in the magnitude 
(slope) for the relationship between BT_operation and services outsourcing 
outcomes.  CompanyEmployees is a control variable for company sizes as 
expressed in the number of employees.  GrossSalesDollars is a control variable 
for company sizes as expressed in gross sales.  Intvsext is a control variable for 
the type of customers, whether internal customers or external customers.  
Neworold is a control variable for whether the services outsourcing contract was a 
new one or renewal of an existing one.  The same notations are used throughout 
all subsequent regression analyses. 
Table 4-1    
 
Regression Results on Contract Cost Increase (the Effect Model) 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) .817 .472  1.732 .094 
BT_operation .355 .172 .342 2.059 .049 
BSREL -.302 .180 -.287 -1.682 .104 
interactionterm .454 .167 .489 2.727 .011 
CompanyEmployees -1.086E-6 .000 -.130 -.824 .417 
GrossSalesDollars -1.065E-13 .000 -.101 -.609 .548 
Intvsext -.158 .402 -.063 -.394 .697 
Neworold -.487 .309 -.252 -1.575 .127 
 
The linear combination of bridge transfer, buyer-supplier trust and the 
interaction between bridge transfer and buyer-supplier accounted for 37.8% of the 
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variance in contract cost increase, R2=.378. The model was statistically 
significant, F(7,28)=2.428, p=.045.   
Based on table 4-1, none of the unstandardized coefficients for the control 
variables was statistically significant.  Specifically, the unstandardized coefficient 
for company size (in the number of employees) was less than .01, p=.417.  The 
unstandardized coefficient for company size (in gross sales dollars) was less than 
.01, p=.548.  Along the same line, whether the end customers were internal 
customers or external customers did not make a difference on contract cost 
increase (p=0.697).  Whether the contract was a new contract or a renewal of 
existing contract did not make a difference on contract cost increase (p=0.167).   
The unstandardized coefficient for bridge transfer was 0.355 and it was 
significant at  p=.049 level.  Hypothesis 1 was supported.  A one unit increase in 
the degree of bridge transfer leads to a 0.355 unit increase in contract cost, 
holding everything else constant.   
The unstandardized coefficient for the interaction of the degree of bridge 
transfer with buyer-supplier trust was 0.454 and it was significant at  p=.011 
level.  The slope of H1 varies based on the level of buyer-supplier trust.  The 
effect was more pronounced when buyer firms and supplier firma engaged in a 
high trust relationship.  Although the interaction term was significant, it was in 
the wrong direction.  Therefore, Hypothesis 1a was not supported.    
When multiple predictor variables were entered, multicollinearity among 
the predictor variables could distort parameter estimates.  Therefore, Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) was computed to evaluate the severity of multicollinearity 
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among the predictor variables.  For this set of data, the largest VIF was 1.2 and it 
was well below the commonly used 5.0 value.  Therefore, multicollinearity was 
not of major concerns here. 
Bootstrapping techniques was used to better gauge error variances and 
confidence interval estimates.  Here control variables were removed from the 
original regression model for parsimony reasons (their unstandardized coefficients 
were not statistically significant) and because bootstrapping does not work well 
with categorical variables.  One thousand random samples with replacement were 
drawn from the original data set and the confidence interval level was set to 95%.  
The results of the bootstrapping showed that the unstandardized coefficientfor the 
bridge transfer variable was .395 and it was significant at .040 level.  The 95% 
confidence interval was (.006, .743).  Hypothesis 1 was supported based on data 
obtained via bootstrapping technique, in addition to evidence obtained from the 
original sample data set.   In addition, the unstandardized coefficientfor the 
interaction term was .491 and it was significant at .008 level.  The 95% 
confidence interval was (.271, 1.020).  Similar to the explanation made earlier, 
although the interaction term was significant, it was in the wrong direction.  
Therefore, Hypothesis 1a was not supported based on data obtained via 
bootstrapping technique, neither was it support based on evidence obtained from 
the original sample data set. 
A subsequent post-hoc analysis was performed on the moderating effect of 
trust on the relationship between bridge transfer and contract cost increase.  The 
result of this analysis is shown in Figure 4-1.   
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Figure 4-1.  Interaction Effect on Contract Cost Increase 
 
Figure 4-1 showed that when there was a low level of trust, the slope 
between bridge transfer and contract cost increase was comparatively mild.  
However, when there was a high level of trust, the slope between bridge transfer 
and contract cost increase was more steep than that of low trust.  One unit 
increase in trust leads to .396 unit increases in the slope between the degree of 
bridge transfer and contract cost increases. 
Regression on Cost of Quality for the Pure Service Model  
 
The linear combination of bridge transfer, buyer-supplier trust and the 
interaction between bridge transfer and buyer-supplier accounted for 10.4% of the 
variance in contract cost increase, R2=.104. However, the model was not 
statistically significant, F(7,30)=.499, p=.827.   
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Table 4-2 presented the regression results on cost of quality for the 
customer facing pure services model when all control variables were included 
(control variables were entered as a separate block of variables to get R squared 
change value).  Based on Table 4-2, none of the unstandardized coefficients for 
the control variables was statistically significant.  Specifically, the unstandardized 
coefficeint for company size (in the number of employees) was close to 0, p=.480.  
The unstandardized coefficient for company size (in gross sales dollars) was close 
to 0, p=.784.  Along the same line, whether the end customers were internal 
customers or external customers did not make a difference on contract cost 
increase (p=.865).  Whether the contract was a new contract or a renewal of an 
existing contract did not make a difference on contract cost increase (p=.586).   
 
Table 4-2   
 
Regression Results on Cost of Quality (The Effect Model) 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) -.255 .565  -.452 .654 
BT_operation .206 .200 .192 1.030 .311 
BSREL -.179 .213 -.163 -.839 .408 
interactionterm -.068 .190 -.069 -.357 .724 
CompanyEmployees 1.136E-6 .000 .127 .715 .480 
GrossSalesDollars -5.791E-
14 
.000 -.051 -.277 .784 
Intvsext -.084 .491 -.032 -.172 .865 
Neworold .198 .359 .099 .551 .586 
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The unstandardized coefficients for bridge transfer was 0.206 , p=.311.  
Hypothesis 2 was not supported.  There was no statistically significant 
relationship between the degree of bridge transfer and buyer’s cost of quality.  
Similarly, the unstandardized coefficient for the interaction of bridge transfer and 
buyer-supplier trust was -.068, p=.724.  Hypothesis 2a was not supported. 
Regression on Service Quality Perception for the Pure Service Model  
 
The linear combination of bridge transfer, buyer-supplier trust and the 
interaction between bridge transfer and buyer-supplier accounted for 69.50% of 
the variance in contract cost increase, R2=.659. The model was statistically 
significant, F(7,29)=8.016, p<.001.   
Table 4-3 presented the regression results on service quality perception for 
the customer facing pure services model when all control variables were included 
(control variables were entered as a separate block of variables to get R squared 
change value).  Based on Table 4-3, none of the unstandardized coefficients for 
the control variables was statistically significant.  Specifically, the unstandardized 
coefficient for company size (in the number of employees) was close to 0, p=.444.  
The unstandardized coefficient for company size (in gross sales dollars) was close 
to 0, p=.603.  Along the same line, whether the end customers were internal 
customers or external customers did not make a difference on contract cost 
increase (p=.215).  Whether the contract was a new contract or a renewal of 
existing contract did not make a difference on contract cost increase (p=.457).   
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The unstandardized coefficient for bridge transfer was -0.335 and it was 
significant at  p=.017 level.  Hypothesis 3 was supported.  A one unit increase in 
the degree of bridge transfer leads to a 0.335 unit decrease in service quality, 
holding everything else constant.   
 
Table 4-3 
   
Regression Results on Service Quality Perception (The Effect Model) 
 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
 (Constant) .591 .378  1.564 .129 
BT_operation -.335 .132 -.301 -2.535 .017 
BSREL .512 .141 .450 3.641 .001 
Interactionterm .396 .126 .388 3.144 .004 
CompanyEmployees -8.189E-7 .000 -.088 -.776 .444 
GrossSalesDollars 7.267E-14 .000 .062 .525 .603 
Intvsext -.412 .325 -.148 -1.269 .215 
Neworold .186 .247 .087 .754 .457 
 
The unstandardized coefficient for the interaction of bridge transfer and 
buyer-supplier trust was 0.396 and it was significant at p=.004 level.  The slope of 
H3 varies based on the level of buyer-supplier trust.  The effect is less pronounced 
when buyer firms and suppliers firm engage in a high trust relationship.  One unit 
increase in trust leads to .396 unit of change in the slope for the  relationship 
between bridge transfer and service quality degradation.  Hypothesis 3a was 
supported.   
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VIF values were examined to detect potential multicollinearity among the 
predictor variables.  For this set of regression, none of the VIF was greater than 
2.0.  There was no evidence of multicollinearity present in the dataset. 
Bootstrapping techniques was used to better gauge error variances and 
confidence interval estimates.  Control variables were removed from the original 
regression model for parsimony reasons (their unstandardized coefficients were 
not statistically significant) and because bootstrapping did not work well with 
categorical variables.  One thousand random samples with replacement were 
drawn from the original data set and the confidence interval level was set to 95%.  
The results of the bootstrapping showed that the unstandardized coefficientfor the 
bridge transfer variable was .356 and it was significant at .025 level.  The 95% 
confidence interval was (-0.697, -0.108).  Hypothesis 3 was supported based on 
data obtained via bootstrapping technique, in addition to evidence obtained from 
the original sample data set.   In addition, the unstandardized coefficient for the 
interaction term was .357 and it was significant at .016 level.  The 95% 
confidence interval was (.136, .712).  Hypothesis 3a was supported based on data 
obtained via bootstrapping technique in addition to data from the original sample 
data set. 
Figure 4-2 depicted the moderation effect on service quality perception.  
When there was a low level of trust, the slope representing the relationship 
between bridge transfer and service quality perception was steep.  However, when 
there was a high level of trust, the slope representing the relationship between 
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bridge transfer and service quality perception was relatively mild.  One unit 
increases in trust level leads to .396 unit change in slope.  
 
 
 
Figure 4-2.  Interaction Effect on Service Quality Perception 
Regression on Contract Cost Increase for the Quasi-Manufacturing Model  
 
Table 4-4 presented the regression results on contract cost increase for the 
quasi-manufacturing model when all control variables were included.  Based on 
Table 4-4 none of the unstandardized coefficients for the control variables was 
statistically significant.  Specifically, the unstandardized coefficientfor company 
size (in the number of employees) was close to 0, p=.923.  The unstandardized 
coefficient for company size (in gross sales dollars) was close to 0, p=.783.  
Along the same line, whether the end customers were internal customers or 
external customers did not make a difference on contract cost increase (p=0.661).  
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Whether the contract was a new contract or a renewal of existing contract did not 
make a difference on contract cost increase (p=0.721).   
Table 4-4  
  
Regression Results on Contract Cost Increase (The No-Effect Model) 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
 (Constant) .261 .425  .613 .542 
BT -.122 .138 -.124 -.883 .382 
Trust -.572 .161 -.537 -3.554 .001 
BTBSR_interaction -.028 .075 -.049 -.367 .715 
CompanyEmployees -9.357E-8 .000 -.012 -.097 .923 
GrossSalesDollars 1.200E-12 .000 .034 .277 .783 
intvsext -.186 .421 -.059 -.441 .661 
newvsold -.094 .263 -.044 -.358 .721 
 
The unstandardized coefficient for bridge transfer (as measured by tie 
strength) was -.122, p-value=.382.  Hypothesis 1’ was supported.  There was no 
statistically significant relationship between bridge transfer and contract cost 
increase in quasi-manufacturing setting.   
The unstandardized coefficient for buyer-supplier trust was -.572 and it 
was significant at p=.001 level.  A one unit increase in buyer-supplier trust leads 
to a .572 unit of decrease in contract cost.   Hypothesis H1a’ was supported. 
VIF values were examined to detect potential multicollinearity among the 
predictor variables.  For this set of regression, none of the VIF was greater than 
2.0.  There was no evidence of multicollinearity present in the dataset. 
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Bootstrapping technique was used to better gauge error variances and 
confidence interval estimates.  Here control variables were removed from the 
original regression model for parsimony reasons (their unstandardized coefficients 
were not statistically significant) and because bootstrapping does not work well 
with categorical variables.  One thousand random samples with replacement were 
drawn from the original data set and the confidence interval level was set to 95%.  
The results of the bootstrapping showed that the unstandardized coefficient for the 
buyer-supplier trust was -.444 and it was significant at .001 level.  The 95% 
confidence interval was (-0.717, -0.204).  Hypothesis 1a’ was supported based on 
data obtained via bootstrapping technique, in addition to evidence obtained from 
the original sample data set.    
Regression on Cost of Quality for the Quasi-Manufacturing Model  
 
Table 4-5 presented the regression results on cost of quality for the quasi-
manufacturing model when all control variables were included.  Based on Table 
4-5, none of the unstandardized coefficients for the control variables was 
statistically significant.  Specifically, the unstandardized coefficient for company 
size (in the number of employees) was close to 0, p=.202.  The unstandardized 
coefficient for company size (in gross sales dollars) was close to 0, p=.454.  
Along the same line, whether the end customers were internal customers or 
external customers did not make a difference on contract cost increase (p=0.297).  
Whether the contract was a new contract or a renewal of existing contract did not 
make a difference on contract cost increase (p=0.773).   
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Table 4-5   
 
Regression Results on Cost of Quality (the No-Effect Model) 
 
 
The unstandardized coefficient for bridge transfer (as measured by tie 
strength) was -0.135, p-value=.286.  There was no statistically significant 
relationship between bridge transfer and cost of quality in quasi-manufacturing 
setting.  Hypothesis 2’ was supported.   
The unstandardized coefficient for buyer-supplier trust was -.524 and it 
was significant at p=.001 level.  A one unit increase in buyer-supplier trust leads 
to .524 unit of decrease in cost of quality.   Hypothesis H2a’ was supported. 
VIF values were examined to detect potential multicollinearity among the 
predictor variables.  For this set of regression, none of the VIF was greater than 
2.0.  There was no evidence of multicollinearity present in the dataset. 
Bootstrapping techniques was used to better gauge error variances and 
confidence interval estimates.  Here control variables were removed from the 
original regression model for parsimony reasons (their unstandardized coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
 (Constant) -.380 .406  -.936 .353 
BT -.135 .126 -.145 -1.076 .286 
Trust -.524 .145 -.526 -3.614 .001 
BTBSR_interaction .041 .070 .074 .583 .562 
newvsold .069 .239 .034 .290 .773 
intvsext .424 .403 .135 1.052 .297 
CompanyEmployees 1.145E-6 .000 .153 1.289 .202 
GrossSalesDollars -7.894E-14 .000 -.086 -.754 .454 
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were not statistically significant) and because bootstrapping did not work well 
with categorical variables.  One thousand random samples with replacement were 
drawn from the original data set and the confidence interval level was set to 95%.  
The results of the bootstrapping showed that the unstandardized coefficient for the 
buyer-supplier trust was -.507 and it was significant at .001 level.  The 95% 
confidence interval was (-0.718, -0.258).  Hypothesis 2a’ was supported based on 
data obtained via bootstrapping technique, in addition to evidence obtained from 
the original sample data set.    
Regression on Service Quality for the Quasi-Manufacturing Model  
 
Table 4-6 presented the regression results on service quality for the quasi-
manufacturing model when all control variables were included.  Based on Table 
4-8, none of the unstandardized coefficients for the control variables was 
statistically significant.  Specifically, the unstandardized coefficientfor company 
size (in the number of employees) was close to 0, p=.854.  The unstandardized 
coefficients for company size (in gross sales dollars) was close to 0, p=.874.  
Along the same line, whether the end customers were internal customers or 
external customers did not make a difference on contract cost increase (p=0.497).  
Whether the contract was a new contract or a renewal of existing contract did not 
make a difference on contract cost increase (p=0.318).   
The unstandardized coefficient for bridge transfer (as measured by tie 
strength) was -0.102, p-value=.452.  There was no statistically significant 
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relationship between bridge transfer and service quality in quasi-manufacturing 
setting.  Hypothesis 3’ was supported.   
The unstandardized coefficient for buyer-supplier trust was .458 and it 
was significant at p=.003 level.  A one unit increase in buyer-supplier trust leads 
to .458 unit of increase in service quality.   Hypothesis H3a’ was supported. 
VIF values were examined to detect potential multicollinearity among the 
predictor variables.  For this set of regression, none of the VIF was greater than 
2.0.  There was no evidence of multicollinearity present in the dataset. 
 
Table 4-6   
 
Regression Results on Service Quality Perception (The No-Effect Model) 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) -.441 .415  -1.063 .292 
BT -.102 .135 -.105 -.758 .452 
Trust .458 .148 .459 3.088 .003 
BTBSR_interaction -.064 .071 -.116 -.903 .371 
CompanyEmployees -1.670E-7 .000 -.022 -.185 .854 
GrossSalesDollars -1.687E-14 .000 -.018 -.159 .874 
Newvsold .249 .247 .118 1.007 .318 
Intvsext .279 .408 .089 .684 .497 
 
Bootstrapping techniques was used to better gauge error variances and 
confidence interval estimates.  Here control variables were removed from the 
original regression model for parsimony reasons (their unstandardized coefficients 
were not statistically significant) and because bootstrapping does not work well 
with categorical variables.  One thousand random samples with replacement were 
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drawn from the original data set and the confidence interval level was set to 95%.  
The results of the bootstrapping showed that the unstandardized coefficientfor the 
buyer-supplier trust was .472 and it was significant at .004 level.  The 95% 
confidence interval was (.234, .788).  Hypothesis 3a’ was supported based on data 
obtained via bootstrapping technique, in addition to evidence obtained from the 
sample data. 
4.2.3 Results Summary 
 
Table 4-7 below summarized the regression results in light of the 
hypothesized models.  Results from the pure services model were presented in 
Table 4-7a and results from the quasi-manufacturing model was presented in 
Table 4-7b. 
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Table 4-7  
Summary of Results 
Table 4-7a   
Summary of Results from the Pure Services Model 
 Hypothesized 
Relationship 
Sample 
Data 
Sig. 
Bootstrap  
Data  
Sig. 
Hypothesis 
Supported? 
H1 Bridge Transfer->Cost Increase Yes Yes Yes 
H1a Interaction->Cost Increase Yes Yes No 
H2 Bridge Transfer->Cost of Quality No No No 
H2a Interaction.->Cost of Quality No No No 
H3 Bridge Transfer->Service Quality Yes Yes Yes 
H3a Interaction->Service Quality Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table 4-7b   
Summary of Results from the Quasi-Manufacturing Model 
 Hypothesized Relationship Sample  
Data  
Sig. 
Bootstrap  
Data  
Sig. 
Hypothesis 
Supported? 
H1’ Bridge Transfer->Cost Increase No No Yes 
H1a’ Trust->Cost Increase Yes Yes Yes 
H2’ Bridge Transfer->Cost of Quality No No Yes 
H2a’ Trust->Cost of Quality Yes Yes Yes 
H3’ Bridge Transfer->Service Quality No No Yes 
H3a’ Trust->Service Quality Yes Yes Yes 
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Chapter 5 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this section, the results of the hypotheses testing are discussed.  Figure 
5-1 summarized the results.  Figure 5-1a depicted the hypothesized effect model 
for pure services (the Effect Model) and Figure 5-1b depicted the hypothesized 
non-effect model for quasi-manufacturing services (the No-Effect Model). 
 
 
 
Figure 5-1a.  Results of Pure Service Model Testing 
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Figure 5-1b.  Results of Quasi Manufacturing Model Testing 
Figure 5-1.   Summary of Model Results 
 
5.1 The Effects of Bridge Transfer on the Outsourcing of Pure Services  
 
The results from both the sample data and the bootstrapped data supported 
the first hypothesis: bridge transfer leads to the increase of services outsourcing 
contract costs.   When services buyer firm took a hand-off approach, the services 
supplier firm, who now occupies the bridge position and spanning across 
information and control gaps between the service buyer firm and the buyer’s 
customers, will take advantage of this position and behave opportunistically.  The 
supplier firm can strategically exaggerate task difficulties in order to appropriate 
more revenue toward its end.  Thus, the sample data provides support to the 
theorized relationship between bridge transfer and supplier’s appropriation 
behavior. 
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The sample data did not provide support for the hypothesis 2, i.e., the 
relationship between bridge transfer and buyer’s cost of quality.  Cost of quality is 
a compound measure that has four dimensions: monitor cost, prevention cost, 
internal and external failure costs.  In this study, three of the four dimensions were 
included.  It is arguably that the clustering of these dimensions was due to custom, 
rather than careful theoretical examination.  Specifically, people lumped four cost 
of quality categories together, based on tradition, rather than based on inter-
category correlations (in the case of a reflective latent construct) or 
complementary nature (in the case of a formative latent construct).  As such, the 
different categories forming the construct of cost of quality may contradict to each 
other and mask any significant effect.  For example, past research has shown that 
there is a negative correlation between prevention costs and external failure costs 
(Fargher and Morse, 1998).  The higher the prevention costs, the lower the 
external failure costs.  If this is the case, any detectable effects would be masked 
by the contradicting nature of these two dimensions.  Therefore, we would not be 
able to detect any statistically significant effect. 
The results from both the sample data and the bootstrapped data supported 
the third hypothesis: bridge transfer leads to the decrease of service quality 
provided by the service supplier firm.   When the service buyer firm took a hand-
off approach, the services supplier firm, who now occupies the bridge position, 
can strategically withhold service quality problems from the service buyer firm 
and offers low quality services to the end customers.  Thus, the sample data 
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provided support to the theorized relationship between bridge transfer and service 
quality degradation.   
Lastly, we have detected the moderation effects of buyer-supplier trust on 
the hypothesized relationship between bridge transfer and two of the services 
outsourcing outcomes: contract cost increase and perceived service quality.  The 
results showed that trust can mitigate the negative effects of bridge transfer on 
service quality perception.   
However, the surprising results came from the interaction effect for the 
outcome variable of contract cost increase.  For contract cost increase, the effect 
was significant but in the opposite direction of the initial hypothesis.  When buyer 
firms exhibit a high level trust toward the supplier firms, the effects of bridge 
transfer on contract cost increase tends to be more severe than when buyer firms 
exhibit a low level trust toward the supplier firms.  This result suggested that too 
much trust is not necessary a good thing.  Rather, there is an optimal amount.  If a 
buyer firm goes over this optimal level and trusts the supplier firm too much, 
there is an increase in the supplier’s appropriation behavior.  Specifically, if a 
buyer firm placed too much trust in the supplier firm, the supplier firm may use 
that trust against the buyer firm and exercises an excessive amount of gaming 
behavior above and beyond a firm with a low level of trust, in terms of increasing 
contract cost. 
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5.2 The Effects of Bridge Transfer on the Outsourcing of Quasi-
Manufacturing Services  
 
The results from the sample data did not detect any significant correlations 
between bridge transfer and any of the three services outsourcing outcomes, 
consistent with our hypothesized framework for quasi-manufacturing types of 
services.  Because there is little or no customer interactions in quasi-
manufacturing types of services, the service buyer firm will not be able to 
establish linkages with buyer’s end customers and therefore, even if the service 
buyer firms take a hands-off approach, the service supplier firms will not occupy 
the powerful bridge position and be able to play off the service buyer firm and 
buyer’s customers.  Further, quasi-manufacturing services contain little variability 
and are easy to be standardized.   This standardization and measurability leave no 
room for the service supplier firms to engage in opportunistic behavior.  Thus, the 
sample data provided support to the theorized no effect model for the relationship 
between bridge transfer and services outsourcing outcomes.    
Both the sample data and data obtained from bootstrapping provided 
support for the importance of buyer-supplier relationship in impacting services 
outsourcing outcomes for quasi-manufacturing services.  In this context, the 
buyer-supplier link is more powerful than the buyer and end customer link. 
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Chapter 6 
IMPLICATIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
6.1 Contributions and Managerial Implications 
 
This study focuses on how to manage services outsourcing for success, 
which is a natural progression from the “what to outsource” research that 
dominates our field (Quinn and Hilmer, 1994; Venkatatesan, 1992; Barney, 1991; 
2001; Wernerfelt, 1984; Williamson, 1975; etc.).  Its theoretical contribution is 
four-fold.  First, it introduces social network theory into the services outsourcing 
context.  As such, it offers a unique perspective on the underlying triadic 
relationship dynamics and their performance implications in a service supply 
network.  This study also extends the social network research by discovering and 
addressing a state of “bridge transfer”, and derive a measurement scale for the 
degree of bridge transfer that is applicable to services outsourcing settings.  Third, 
this study explores the role of buyer-supplier relationship in mitigating the effects 
of bridge transfer.  Lastly, the effects of bridge transfer on services outsourcing 
outcomes are delineated based on service types.  
Services outsourcing has been met with an alarming amount of failed 
attempts.  We posit that an important root cause of these failures is the lack of 
understanding of the dynamic nature of the triadic relationships among the 
services buyer, services supplier, and the buyer’s customer.  By extending the 
social network theory into the services outsourcing context, we are able to reveal 
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the relationship structures within the triad of services supply network post service 
outsourcing implementation and its consequences.  Once the service outsourcing 
arrangements are in place and a services supplier begins to interface with the 
customer, a situation unique to the services outsourcing emerges.  The services 
buyer invariably loses its bridge position to the supplier.  Loss of the bridge 
position means loss of leverage.  Unless intervened, the services supplier would 
end up gaining the advantage that comes with being a tertius gaudens.  To 
mitigate this risk, we propose the service buyer should continue to monitor the 
supplier, the buyer’s customers, and the relationships between the services 
supplier and the buyer’s customers after the outsourcing arrangements.   
This approach may appear to be counter-intuitive.  One of the major 
incentives behind outsourcing in a business setting is cost reduction, and extra 
monitoring costs extra money.  What a buyer typically would prefer to do is only 
monitor its relationship with the service supplier after outsourcing because the 
buyer lets its supplier handle the relationship with its customers.  After all, the 
supplier is being compensated for taking care of the buyer’s customer.  However, 
the buyer must realize the consequences of such bridge transfer.  The field is 
littered with failed services outsourcing with the supplier as the new bridge, as 
illustrated earlier, and this outcome can have long-term, negative consequences to 
the buyer.   
The effects of bridge transfer are not universal across all services 
instances.  In quasi-manufacturing setting, due to the lack of interaction between 
the service suppliers and the buyer’s end-customers, the bridge position may 
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never be transferred to the service supplier firm.  Further, the lack of customer 
interaction makes quasi-manufacturing types of services easy to be standardized 
and measured and leaves less room for the opportunistic behavior of the service 
supplier firm.  Therefore, while we advocate the bridge decay strategy for the 
outsourcing of pure services, it may not be necessary for firms who outsource 
quasi-manufacturing types of services. 
6.2 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 
This study took the buyer’s perspective and collected data on contract cost 
increase, cost of quality and service quality perception from respondents from the 
buyer firms.  Future research can expand this study and include perspectives from 
other nodes in the services outsourcing triad.  For example, future study can 
measure the service quality perception from the end-customers’ perspective to 
triangulate the research results and to understand how does bridge transfer impact 
end customers’ repeat purchasing intentions?  In addition, this study can be 
expanded to take the perspective from the supplier firms and examine the 
outsourcing dynamics happening in the suppliers’ firms.   
 This study integrates the social network theory and services outsourcing 
context by focusing on triads and the advantages associated with tertius gaudins 
in the triad.  There are ample additional opportunities to extend our research.  
Future research can expand beyond the triadic structures and examine how the 
embeddedness of a service firm impacts its structural choices.  For example, if a 
services buyer is embedded in a sparse network or a service supplier relies on the 
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buyer’s extended network for future business opportunities, the service buyer may 
have more enduring leverage over the supplier beyond a single services 
outsourcing contract.  Under this type of scenario, bridge transfer may be a 
plausible strategy for the buyer.  The buyer could potentially rely on its extended 
network as a containment mechanism for the supplier’s opportunistic behaviors.   
When the services buyer is the bridge to extended networks that are 
valuable to the supplier, the buyer can also exert its role as the tertius iungens, the 
third who joins (Obstfeld, 2005).  Similar to the tertius gaudens, the tertius 
iungens also derives benefits from the bridge position.  However, in contrast to 
the role of the teritus gaudens who derives benefits from playing off the nodes on 
each side of the structural hole, the tertius iungens derives benefits via mediating 
between two disconnected nodes.  An intriguing question then arises as to when it 
would be more desirable for the buying firm to play the role of the tertius iungens 
instead of the tertius gaudens. 
Besides social embeddedness, other areas of the social network theory 
deserve further exploration.  For example, Tsai and Ghoshal (1998) distinguish 
three dimensions of social capital—the cognitive dimension, the relational 
dimension, and the structural dimension.  How could these dimensions compete 
or complement each other in a services outsourcing context?  How could they 
influence the formation and strength of different types of ties among the triad in 
the service supply network?  These are all important questions that have 
significant managerial relevance. 
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One interesting scenario that can also be considered in future studies 
entails the complete supply chain disintermediation.  Here, the services supplier 
completely bypasses the services buyer and works directly with the end 
customers.  One common example of such disintermediation happens in tax 
preparation firms.  Once the outsourced services suppliers (accountants) work 
with its customers, they are then able to obtain the contact information of these 
customers.  They would have the option of contacting those customers directly for 
future tax returns, completely bypassing the tax preparation firm.  Another 
interesting example happens in Internet portals such as the travel site hosted by 
Yahoo.com.  In this case, the travelers (customers) use the portal (buyer) to locate 
an airline (services supplier) that sells the least expensive ticket.  Once they have 
found the ticket, they can go directly to the airline’s website to make the purchase 
and take advantage of a small savings by purchasing directly from the airline’s 
website.  In the above two scenarios, no triadic relationships remain among the 
service supplier, service buyer, and buyer’s customer.  At the end of the 
transaction, the service buyer is completely dropped out of the supply network.  
This loss of intermediary entity deserves further investigation.   
The theoretical models in this study were limited largely to the 
substitution type of outsourcing, as opposed to the abstention type (Gilley and 
Rasheed, 2000).  By doing so, this focus is on the conscious choice of replacing 
internal production with external purchases (i.e. substitution), which contrasts the 
regular “sourcing” decisions that occur because of the lack of internal production 
capabilities (i.e. abstention).  In other words, these models do not apply to some 
  116 
of the Internet sellers who purchase logistics services from carriers such as UPS 
to deliver their products to their customers.  In this example, these Internet sellers 
simply do not have the capability to deliver their products on their own and have 
to purchase services from UPS. It is a regular sourcing decision, not an 
outsourcing decision.  Therefore, the network dynamics involved in abstention 
types of services sourcing is left up to future studies. 
Services outsourcing practices are indeed very complex.  Social network 
theory offers a wide array of opportunities to tackle this complex task.  This study 
is only the first step toward analyzing this challenging issue.  Nevertheless, this 
study revealed insights omitted by other theories used in services outsourcing 
studies.  The insights gained from integrating services outsourcing and social 
networks concepts are of great theoretical and managerial relevance that can help 
us move the field forward. 
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